The Value of Pharmaceutical R&D Projects under Uncertainty and Drug Approval Policy by Wei, Wei
The Value of Pharmaceutical R&D
Projects under Uncertainty and
Drug Approval Policy
WEI WEI
Doctor of Philosophy
University of York
Economics
October 2016

Abstract
Pharmaceutical R&D projects often have the characteristics of irreversibility on
investment, flexibility of investment timing, and uncertainty in cash flows. In this
thesis, the real options approach is used as the evaluation tool for these projects and
three continuous-time investment models are developed. In chapter 4, we discuss
the effects of the investment lag and commercialization flexibility on the investment
decisions under uncertainty. Chapter 5 examines which organizational structures,
the decentralized or centralized pharmaceutical R&D project, are more socially
desirable in terms of early investment and higher project value. Chapter 6 considers
whether adding a time constraint on the drug development process will increase the
investment incentives and how remuneration level will influence the quality of the
products, as well as the timing of commercialization.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and the Problems Solved in the The-
sis
The pharmaceutical industry is an indispensable part of modern society since it
plays an important role in improving peoples’ health and the quality of their lives.
Researchers have exerted great efforts in solving many of the problems in the in-
dustry such as making policies to increase investment incentives for research and
development (R&D) projects in order to tackle the neglected diseases by setting rea-
sonable quality standards for drugs so that patients will benefit from its therapeutic
improvements. Meanwhile, investors would not be intimidated by the unattainable
quality level and reject the investment proposals. Although there are usually no
quick fixes to these problems, every effort towards perfection, no matter how small,
is important and so I am motivated to study, practice and help solve these problems.
This thesis will discuss the various problems concerning the different phases of
the R&D process. There are usually three essential phases before the launch of a
new drug: the discovery or pre-clinical phase, R&D, and commercialization. The
combination of the three phases of clinical trials is referred to as the R&D process.
In the discovery phase, animal testing is conducted and the results are crucial in
13
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determining whether they are safe enough for human testing. If sufficient evidence
suggests that the drugs are safe for human testing, a sequence of clinical trials will
begin. Usually, three phases of clinical trials will be conducted to make sure that the
new chemical entities (NCE) will advance to the new drug application stage where
the authority decides whether to approve the drug or not. Finally, if the product is
proven successful by the authority, the commercialization process starts and at this
stage, revenue is generated.
In chapter 4, this thesis will introduce the concept of commercialization flexibil-
ity. Commercialization flexibility allows the decision maker of any R&D project
to delay selling the drugs by the end of the R&D phase when they are approved.
On the other hand, if there is no commercialization flexibility, commercialization is
immediate, giving the decision maker no choice but to launch selling the products at
the approval date.
In an R&D project with commercialization flexibility, two decisions are con-
sidered: when to optimally start the R&D process and when to optimally start the
commercialization process. Both of these processes should be considered simul-
taneously; therefore, the decision maker’s problem can be viewed as a compound
option. However with projects with immediate commercialization, there is only
one decision to be made: when to optimally start the R&D process. This thesis
will discuss the effect that commercialization flexibility has on the projects that are
suitable for accelerated approval and priority review.
In 1992 and 2014, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Medicines &
Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in the United Kingdom launched
the “FDA Accelerated Approval Program” and the “Early Access to Medicines
Scheme” (EAMS) respectively, to facilitate and expedite development and review
of new drugs, in order to address unmet medical needs in the treatments of any
serious or life threatening conditions. A serious disease or condition is defined in
the expanded access regulations as follows:
. . . a disease or condition associated with morbidity that has
substantial impact on day-to-day functioning. Short-lived and
14
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self-limiting morbidity will usually not be sufficient, but the
morbidity need not be irreversible if it is persistent or recurrent.
Whether a disease or condition is serious is a matter of clinical
judgment, based on its impact on such factors as survival,
day-to-day functioning, or the likelihood that the disease, if left
untreated, will progress from a less severe condition to a more
serious one.1 (Page.2)
Both programs aim to ensure the therapies of the above conditions are approved
and available to patients as soon as possible if the therapies’ benefits justify the
risks. However, from the perspective of the pharmaceutical companies, it is un-
clear whether immediate commercialization on the approval date is an optimal
strategy. Therefore, the influence that commercial flexibility will have on investment
incentives is worth discussing.
Before going deep into the problem, it is ideal to think of two possible scenarios.
The first is that commercialization flexibility is allowed and the decision maker
has the option to defer selling the products by the end of the R&D process. The
policy offers more flexible options that are favorable to the investors such that
investment incentives are increased and the projects will be started sooner. However,
the flexibility may also delay the commercialization process. The second scenario is
that commercialization flexibility is not allowed and pharmaceutical companies are
compelled to sell the products immediately on the approval date. This policy will
decrease the investment incentives so that projects will be started later. However,
since no commercialization flexibility is allowed, the products will be available to
the patients by the end of the R&D process.
In these two scenarios, it is not clear which project will allow patients to have
earlier access to the products. Moreover, it is controversial whether commercializa-
tion flexibility will always increase investment incentives and thus lead to earlier
investments under uncertainty since uncertainty allows the decision maker to wait
1http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/UCM358301.pdf
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longer to avoid the risks and invest only if the conditions are favorable enough. This
type of event is usually considered as the “bad news principle”.
In this chapter, this thesis will discuss which project, with or without commercial-
ization flexibility, provides more investment incentives causing faster investments;
and whether commercialization flexibility will prolong or shorten the time that the
final products are launched in the market.
In chapter 5, this thesis considers how structural arrangements, private, public
or private-public partnerships for pharmaceutical R&D projects may address the
lack of investment issue on tackling Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs). Since
the main reason for lack of investments lies in the uncertainty of a future market,
public organizations could help ease the problem by signing the Advance Purchase
Commitments (APC) contract in a private-public partnership (PPP).
Is it possible to infer that the problem will be less severe if the government takes
more responsibilities? Dependent on the participation degree of the government in
the projects, free market is, at one extreme, where no public sectors are involved. A
social planner’s project, which is conducted solely by the government, is at the other
extreme. The project with private-public partnership or the decentralized project is
between the two extremes. This thesis will focus on the decentralized project and
the social planner’s project since free market does not provide a good solution to the
lack of investment problem.
In comparison of the projects, three problems are discussed. The first problem is
which project, when decisions are optimally made to maximize the project values,
will start sooner. For the products with the same required standards of quality, one
could expect that an earlier start of the project means a faster finish granting patients
earlier access to the potential treatments. To figure out the investment timing of both
projects, the optimal investment thresholds will be compared. A lower investment
threshold implies earlier investment timing.
Second, we analyze how remuneration levels can be used to adjust the standards
of quality of the products. Despite the importance of incentivizing pharmaceutical
companies to invest in drug developments and to start the project sooner, making
16
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sure that the products have a high standard of quality is also of great concern. In
this model, a noticeable difference between the decentralized project and the social
planner’s project is that the decentralized project is a game with two players, the
government and a pharmaceutical company, while in the social planner’s project, the
pharmaceutical company is not involved and only the government will be in charge
of the whole project. Thus the remuneration level will need to be considered in the
decentralized project while and not within the social planner’s project. In addition,
the remuneration is considered to be the revenue for the pharmaceutical company
but costs the government money in the decentralized project. Moreover, it is shown
that the remuneration level, which can be used as a great tool of adjustment, can
affect the optimal standard of quality. However, this is not feasible in the social
planner’s project.
Last, the value of the projects, under different managerial structures, is compared.
In the decentralized project, it is shown that even if remunerations are internalized
by adding the project values of the pharmaceutical company and the government, the
total value of the decentralized project is different from the social planner’s project.
The reason for this difference is that the optimal decisions made in the decentralized
project are constrained maximization problems, while the maximization problem is
unconstrained in the social planner’s project.
In chapter 6, this thesis discusses whether a time-constrained R&D project may
help further increase investment incentives in the projects that aim for NTDs in
the low-income countries. The purpose of the chapter is to discuss the effects that
time constraint will have on the investment incentives in the APC to deal with
NTDs. According to WIPO (2005), between 1975 and 2000, it is estimated that
only 10% of global R&D resources were directed at diseases accounting for 90%
of the global disease burden. Also, in this 25-year period, only 13 new drugs for
neglected diseases were approved for use. The primary reason for lack of investment
in fighting NTDs is that most of the patients who suffer from these diseases live
in low-income countries and the prices of treatments are not affordable to them.
In other words, their need for treatments can hardly be turned into demand with
17
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foreseeable profits. Hence it is understandable why few R&D projects are specific
to the diseases in these countries.
In addition, free markets alone do not provide with a solution so the involvements
of governments, NGOs and philanthropists are crucial since these non-profit driven
organizations can be relied upon to provide the market that the pharmaceutical
companies need. Among the numerous proposals for stimulating more research with
the participations of the above organizations, the Advance Purchase Commitments
(APC) contract is claimed to be one of the most effective approaches to increase the
incentives of the pharmaceutical companies since it guarantees a solid future market
with a legally binding contract (Kremer et al. (2005)).
The outline of the commitments is as follows:
(1) Define a technical specification of the potential product.
(2) Specify the price and quantity that makes the patients affordable and the manu-
facturers profitable with payments from sponsors.
(3) Manufacturers are obliged to keep providing further treatments at sustainable
prices afterwards.
Mostly, there are no constraints regarding when the products have to be finished.
The pharmaceutical companies will receive the payments from the sponsors as
long as the technical specification is met regardless of how long it takes. Thus the
companies do not have incentives to speed up investment. This is less of a problem
if the contract is a “winner-take-all” arrangement since companies will have to
compete to be the first producer so that they will be awarded. However, in practice,
the arrangement of multiple winners is more reasonable because it does not only
provide more incentives for manufacturers to join without competition, but it also
makes the coexistence of products with varying benefits and risks possible (Berndt
and Hurvitz (2005)).
Without setting a deadline of drug development in the contract, the pharmaceuti-
cal companies have less incentive to accelerate the developments that are crucial to
the patients in serious conditions. A natural solution will be to add a time constraint
in the contract specifying when the R&D process should be finished or the rewards
18
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
will be reduced dramatically. In this case, the pharmaceutical companies may not
finish the projects on time if the projects are not started earlier, which will likely
increase their investment incentive. Thus the value of the project will also depend
on the time of expiration of the investment opportunity.
It is worth noting that although the thesis is pharmaceutical industry oriented, the
models developed in the three chapters are not only applicable to the R&D projects.
These models can be used to evaluate any R&D projects that are featured with either
the combination of compound options, investment lags and time constraint or with
these properties respectively. For instance, an irreversible R&D project to develop a
new type of car with both options to decide when to start the R&D process and the
flexibility on when to launch the sell of the cars can also be evaluated by using the
models in chapter 4.
1.2 The Real Options Approach and its Synergy with
Pharmaceutical R&D Projects
In standard economics theories, the rule of thumb to determine whether an invest-
ment is worth taking or not is to calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) of the
project. The investment proposal is acceptable if the project has a positive NPV, i.e.,
when the present value of the cash inflow is greater than the present value of the
cash outflow. The investment proposal is rejected if the NPV is negative. However,
The “NPV rule” does not fit every problem since an NPV calculation only uses
information that is known at the time of the appraisal. The decision maker is not
allowed to adjust to new information even if more choices are available in the future.
More specifically, if NPV calculation is used in the following conditions, the
project value will tend to be underestimated. First, the costs spent to start the project
are sunk costs and irreversible. Any improper decisions made can have tremendous
impacts on the profitability of these projects. Second, the investment decisions do
not have to be made right away. Decision makers then have the flexibility to wait
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while updating information and pay the sunk costs only if the situation is favorable
enough. Last, the cash flows are uncertain and subject to variations.
It is the “risk-adjusted expected NPV” and not the current NPV that matters.
Since the value of the project is affected by both the expected NPV and the discount-
ing effect of time, it is possible that the discount expected NPV of the project in the
future is positive while the current NPV is negative. Thus a rejected proposal by the
“NPV rule” can be accepted in the context of the real options theory and a project
with good potential can be saved. The reason that the NPV rule does not fit for the
pharmaceutical R&D projects is that most of these projects are endowed with the
above three properties: irreversibility, uncertainty and flexibility.
For irreversibility, according to DiMasi et al. (2016), it is estimated that the
average pre-tax cost of new drugs and biologics development is $2,870 million (2013
US dollars), which includes the costs of pre-human research, clinical studies and
post-approval research. Although it is common for certain projects to be abandoned
during each of the phases, most of the costs spent are irreversible once out of pocket.
Furthermore, various types of uncertainties exist in the industry. Among these,
technical uncertainties are the greatest one. O’Hagan and Farkas (2009) show that
the traditional approach to R&D, which relies on the number of “shots on goal”
hoping some lucky result will be obtained, is getting less effective.
The philosophy of this traditional approach is based on the idea that the company
will have a better chance to invent a profitable product with more attempts on drug
discovery. Also, the reason that taking “shots on goal” matters to R&D is while
many of the potential products look very promising in the lab, it is unclear whether
they will be translated into effective therapeutic treatments for patients. This typical
pattern of coming up with new products leads to great volatility in the expected
profits in the industry.
Besides, the uncertainties from the regulators setting new rules for the safety and
effectiveness of products, competitors coming into market with alternative brand or
generics and disgruntled shareholders also make it difficult to estimate the expected
payoffs.
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Lastly, because of the numerous uncertainties in the pharmaceutical industry,
investors have to think before they leap. Although competitors or shareholders may
sometimes exert pressures on earlier adoptions of the investment decision, decision
makers are usually provided with the flexibility to wait and keep on updating
information until it is optimal to start the R&D process. Because of irreversibility
and uncertainty, the value of flexibility can be high. The conclusions drawn on the
real options approach in terms of the evaluation and feasibility of projects can be
quite different from those using the NPV rule since the value of flexibility is not
taken into account in the latter approach. Hence, to make better investment decisions
on pharmaceutical R&D projects, the real options approach is chosen in the thesis.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis both contributes to the Health Technology Assessment (HTA) and the
Real Options literature. This thesis contributes to the HTA literature by providing
possible solutions to solve the lack of investment problem on NTDs in the developing
countries. Three models were developed to look at how investment decisions are
affected under different scenarios so that possible policies can be made to encourage
earlier investments. In each model, we discuss a specific potential policy, such as
offering commercialization flexibility after drug approval, altering the managerial
structure of the project and exerting time constraints on the development stage, that
will probably help ease the problem.
By comparing the benchmark models with the models that policies are im-
plemented, policy recommendations are provided. Moreover, since most of the
pharmaceutical R&D projects have the properties of irreversibility, uncertain cash
flows and flexible investment timing, the real options approach is used to estimate
the value of projects, the optimal investment and commercialization thresholds,
and the optimal quality standard of the products that the government sets. In the
HTA literature, the mostly widely used approaches to evaluate R&D projects are
net present value (NPV), expected net present value (ENPV) and discounted cash
21
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flows (DCF) (Hartmann and Hassan (2006)). Besides, the financial indicators such
as return on equity (ROE) and internal rate of return (IRR) are also considered.
However, these approaches are static analyses, which fails to capture the option
value and underestimates the project values. When the real options approach is used
to evaluate pharmaceutical R&D projects, the three properties mentioned above are
carefully taken into account. Thus it suits the evaluation of the pharmaceutical R&D
projects better.
This thesis also contributes to the Real Options literature. In chapter 4, it
models an R&D project, which combines a compound option with an investment
lag. Normally, when a compound option is exercised, the holder of the option will
get a new option immediately. However, when an investment lag is combined, the
holder no longer acquires the new option at the exercise date, but at the end of the
investment lag. Thus the lag makes the value of the new option a random variable at
the exercise date. The uncertainty of the value of the new option further complicates
the optimal investment decisions.
In chapter 5, this thesis assumes the value of the project is dependent on a
stochastic process that has different growth rates before and after the investment
taking place, which requires the consideration of different expected discount factors
in the optimal stopping problem. This makes the comparison of the project value
more difficult when the projects have different optimal investment timings.
In chapter 6, this thesis models the sudden success of a time-constrained R&D
project by a Poisson process. It is found that the intensity of the Poisson process
λ is of great importance in determining the optimal investment threshold in this
model, while λ is usually considered to be a less important parameter, which simply
enters the analysis through increasing the discount rates in other models ( Hsu and
Schwartz (2008)). The impression that the intensity only increases the discount
factor can be misleading in particular problems.
In chapters 4 and 5, it is assumed that the projects will be successful with
probability 1 and even if the project in chapter 6 has the possibility of failure, the
abandonment options are not considered in all the related chapters.
22
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In practice, the abandonment options are particularly crucial to the pharmaceu-
tical industry since the former promising product may result as unpromising as
more information is collected during the R&D process. The flexibility of aban-
donment enables the decision makers to minimize the losses even if the previous
investment decision was problematic. Nevertheless, as it has been shown in the real
options literature, the abandonment option will usually decrease the option value of
waiting since the project is no longer (partly) irreversible, which will often lead to
earlier investment. In order to focus on the problems that we are interested in, the
abandonment option is not considered during the R&D process in the thesis.
23

Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Real Options Literature
Following Myers (1977), it is quite natural to think of many investment problems
that feature irreversibility, flexibility and uncertainty as real options. According to
the classification of Trigeorgis (1993a), there are seven types of real options: to
defer, time to build, alter operation scale, abandon, switch, growth and multiple
interacting options.
Among all, one of the most common flexibilities on investment is the option to
defer. With this option, the decision maker does not have to make the investment
decision right away under uncertainty. Instead, he or she can wait while updating
information needed to execute and only kill the option when information is favorable
enough. Waiting implies both discounting and variation of the future NPV. Since
it is possible that the discounted future NPV is larger than the NPV of immediate
investment, the option to defer adds value to the whole project. This type of option
has been examined in many papers such as Tourinho (1979), McDonald and Siegel
(1986) and Majd and Pindyck (1987). Though different investment projects are
considered in these papers, the one thing in common is that the the option values are
proved to be crucial in calculating the values of these projects.
25
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Another option shown in this thesis is the compound option. Geske (1979) points
out that many opportunities have a sequential nature, where latter opportunities are
available only if earlier opportunities are undertaken. Also, in the paper of Geske
(1979), a theory is presented to price the option to acquire a latter opportunity which
depends on financial instruments. Similarly, Carr (1988) discussed a compound
option that the latter opportunities are options to exchange for other options. Both
papers use contingent claim analysis (CCA) to compute the option values. In chapter
5, we model a pharmaceutical R&D project that has both the options to defer R&D
and commercialization process. Moreover, the former option is the prerequisite
for having the latter one. Hence the project can be considered as a compound real
options. However, dynamic programing, instead of CCA, is used in calculating the
option and project values.
In Kulatilaka (1995), it is concluded that a project that has the following char-
acteristics will lead to time-to-build option values: (1) Investment decisions and
associated cash outlays occurring sequentially over time; (2) a maximum rate at
which outlays and construction can proceed, namely, it takes “time to build”; and
(3) a project yielding no cash returns until it is completed. In a sense, the models in
this thesis can be considered as simplified versions of time-to-build models.
First, it is assumed in the thesis that the R&D costs are paid as cost flows in
some projects. However, it is also assumed that no further decisions will be made
during the R&D process and the project will continue to proceed till the end of
it without abandonment options. Second, the projects take time to finish. But no
variables specifying the speed of construction or outlays are presented. Instead,
we either specify a fixed time or under certain rules, such as a jump in the quality
standard being reached, that the project will be finished. Thirdly, no revenues are
generated until the project is finished which conforms to the second characteristic
of a time-to-build model. The time difference between investment costs and payoffs
complicates the valuation of a project. On one hand, the payoffs will need to be
discounted back to the time when investment costs are paid. The problem of how
much value will be discounted is not always easy. On the other hand, uncertainty
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increases with time, hence the future expected NPV of projects is extremely volatile.
The combination of the two problems increases the difficulty of evaluations.
In real options literature, the duration of time between the start and completion
of a project is usually called the investment lag, 1 delivery lag or implementation
lag, which has been used to model construction delay in many papers. Alvarez and
Keppo (2002) considers a model of investment where investment lag is dependent
on the underlying stochastic process. They find that the impact of delivery lag on
investment is negative. In other words, an increase in the investment lag delays
investment. Sarkar and Zhang (2013) argues that the conventional result “increase
in uncertainty and investment lag should have inhibiting effect on investment” can
be reversed if the project has sufficient reversibility. Majd and Pindyck (1987) and
Pindyck (1993) discuss two models that take time to build where the firms can invest
at some maximum rate and abandon the projects in the mid stream. Thijssen (2015)
proposed a model that can be used to value especially large-scale infrastructure
projects, where the revenue process and construction process are possibly correlated.
The concept of investment lag has also been used in the models of this thesis, which
proves to have tremendous impacts on the project value and investment decisions.
Last, Trigeorgis (1993b) discussed the valuation of a project if multiple options
exist in the same project. The sum of each option individually could be different
from the combined option value, which is dependent on the option type, the degree
of overlap of exercise regions and the sequence of options, etc. Thus valuing each
option individually then summing the values will lead to the unreliable evaluation of
the project. In chapter 5, a project with interactive options is presented and we show
that the combined value of the options will further decrease if the project is run by
two parties instead of one decision maker. The reason of a smaller combined value
is due to the different goals of the two parties and that the exercise of one option
limits the optimal exercise of the other. Thus the maximization problems that the
two players solve are constrained.
1Investment lag was used by Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996), delivery lag was used by Alvarez and
Keppo (2002) and implementation lag was used by Sarkar and Zhang (2013). These terms can be
used interchangeably.
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2.2 Health Technology Assessment Literature
After showing the various types of real options models that are related to the
thesis, we next discuss the evaluation methods that are used by the majority in the
pharmaceutical industry and the reasons why real options theory is better suited for
evaluation of pharmaceutical R&D projects. In one word, the following evaluation
methods that will be introduced are static analysis while real options approach is
dynamic analysis.
Hartmann and Hassan (2006) present an in-depth analysis of collected empirical
data regarding the application of different valuation methods in the pharmaceutical
industry. Every pharmaceutical project can be considered as a series of sub-projects
and is composed of several nodes including discovery, pre-clinical, phase I, II and III
and approval. In each of these nodes, NPV/ENPV/DCF2 are the most widely used
methods for evaluation. The number of project managers who admit the adoption
of these methods in each phases ranging from 59% to 100%. Others methods such
as RoE/RoI/EVA3, IRR (Internal Rate of Return), scoring model and real options
analysis are also mentioned. But they are not as popular as NPV/ENPV/DCF.
Pandey (2003) discusses the pros and cons of evaluating a pharmaceutical R&D
project by using NPV and ENPV (a probability-adjusted version of DCF is ENPV).
It is argued that NPV is inferior since it assumes that decision makers are unable to
take further actions such as abandonments based on future information while ENPV
combines NPV and decision tree analyses by taking the probability distribution of
future outcome into consideration. Indeed, decision tree helps decision makers by
calculating the expected payoffs at every decision node so that better actions will be
taken.
However, in real options point of view, even if the abandonment option is given,
it does not necessarily need to be taken immediately. It is better to abandon the
project when the information is bad enough or there is little chance that the project
2The most widely used evaluation methods in the pharmaceutical industry: NPV (Net Present
Value), ENPV (Expected Net Present Value) and DCF (Discounted Cash Flow)
3Other evaluation methods in the pharmaceutical industry: ROE (Return on Equity), ROI (Return
on investment) and EVA (Economic Value Added)
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will be feasible anymore. At every decision node, ENPV computes the expected
payoff of the project, however, the option value is not taken into account. Thus the
project value is still underestimated. Neglecting the option values in the evaluation
of project will lead to false rejection of the investment proposal.
Moreover, decision tree analysis is based on discrete time models and it is
difficult for these models to capture the changes of NPV and option values for any
given time compared to continuous time models. In addition, discrete time models
can probably deal with problems on a case basis, but the lack of general results
makes it more difficult to do comparative statics in general cases. These problems
can be improved by using continuous time real options model.
ROE measures the profitability of a company by showing how much profits
it generates with the money that shareholders have invested. ROI is computed as
the difference of gain and cost from investment divided by cost of investment. It
measures the efficacy of an investment and represents in a percentage term. EVA
measures the value created that exceeds the required return from the company’s
shareholders and is computed as the net profit minus the opportunity cost of the
capital of a firm.
Although these financial indicators provides useful information for comparisons
between projects, they are static and not reliable for projects that have high volatility.
For instance, the ROE is low if a firm decides to sacrifice a large part of the present
earnings in change of a future earnings (Lesáková (2007)). But it does not necessarily
indicate that the profitability of the firm is low. Moreover, these ratios fail to capture
risks which lead to uncertainties. As a result, it is never recommended to treat these
ratios as the only knowledge required to make investment decisions. They will have
to be used in combination of other evaluation tools for better decision making.
IRR can be used to rank the multiple promising projects that a firm may want
to invest. Generally speaking, the higher the IRR, the more profitable the project.
However, in evaluation of the a pharmaceutical R&D project, the most difficult
problem is to estimate the cash flows accurately because of uncertainties. IRR, which
relies on the accurate approximation of cash flows, is a good measure on ranking
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projects if the cash flows are certain. Thus, similar to other financial indicators, it is
better used with combination of other evaluation methods that are able to estimate
the expected cash flows.
Henriksen and Traynor (1999) proposed a flexible R&D project-selection method
to rank R&D project alternatives, which relies on researcher-accepted peer review
in the form of a user-friendly questionnaire. It was designed to help the federal
research laboratory with funding selection. Although scoring models can be useful
for valuing projects with relative values, they are not able to measure project values
in absolute terms and thus comparative statics can hardly be applied. Moreover,
they fail to capture the dynamics of the whole project. For instance, it is difficult for
scoring models to explain how the project value changes in certain states and what
leads to these changes.
Finally, real options theory is recommended to evaluate pharmaceutical R&D
projects since most of these projects have the following properties: irreversibility of
investment costs, managerial flexibility and uncertainty in cash flows. Irreversibility
creates opportunity cost and value of waiting. Volatility of the project’s payoffs
makes managerial flexibility even more valuable. None of the above evaluation
methods mentioned capture these properties, which lead to unreliable evaluation of
project values.
It is not new to evaluate a pharmaceutical R&D project by using real options
theory. For instance, Schwartz and Moon (1996) discusses the evaluation of a
pharmaceutical R&D project when both cost and the completed value of the project
are uncertain. Hsu and Schwartz (2008) studies the problem of under-investment in
R&D for vaccines in the developing countries and the design of research incentives.
In the thesis, we use continuous time real options models to solve the evaluation
problems of the pharmaceutical R&D projects and provide with policy advices in
terms of how to incentivize earlier investments and improve the quality of products.
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2.3 Industrial Organization and Contract Theory Lit-
erature
The thesis is also related to the IO literature in that, in chapter 5, it analyzes how
different structural arrangements of an R&D project will lead to different optimal
investment threshold and optimal quality standard of the projects. The decentralized
R&D project, which is run together by the government and a pharmaceutical com-
pany, and the social planner’s project or the centralized project, are compared. This
is similar to the vertical control problem in the relationship of an “upstream firm”
and a “downstream firm” (Tirole (1988)).
However, there are some differences between the two frameworks. In this model,
the relationship between the government and some pharmaceutical company is con-
nected by an advance purchase commitments contract. The contract is proposed by
the government, which ensures that the pharmaceutical company will receive some
predetermined revenues once the requirements of the government are met. Thus
the government moves first by setting the quality standard and the pharmaceutical
company starts the R&D project next and keeps improving the quality of the product
until the quality standard is reached.
The government is similar to the role of the downstream firm since the govern-
ment first purchases the products from the pharmaceutical company and then sells
them to the consumers. In the IO literature, however, the upstream firm usually
moves first by selling the intermediate products to the downstream firms, and then to
the retailers (downstream firm). After transformation of the intermediate products,
the government sells the final products to consumers. Moreover, in terms of welfare
analysis, this thesis’ finding is similar to those in the IO literature, which shows that
the value of the integrated firm is higher, but for a different reason.
For instance, Spengler (1950) argues that a vertical structure is more profitable
under vertical integration than under a linear price since the monopoly profit of
the vertical structure is realized. In addition, the social welfare is increased due
to the elimination of the “double marginalization” problem. In this model, the
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effects of the prices and demands of the intermediate and final product are not
considered, the different projects’ values are only dependent on the quality of the
product. The reason for a higher value for the integrated project is because the
maximization problems that the government and the pharmaceutical company solve
are constrained, while the problem the social planner solves is unconstrained.
In addition, the relationship between the government and the pharmaceutical
company can also be considered as a variation of the principal-agent relationship in
the contract theory. The government can be viewed as the principal who maximizes
the patients’ welfare, while the pharmaceutical company is the agent, who maximizes
profits and agrees to produce medicines for the government. For the government, it
is better if the R&D project starts as soon as possible so that the quality of the drug
will be reached sooner and the patients will have earlier access to the new products.
However, it is the pharmaceutical company who determines when to start the
project. Because of uncertainty, starting the project as soon as possible is not always
the best strategy (real options analysis). The decision maker will often choose to
wait and invest when the conditions are favorable enough.
Although there is no asymmetric information in this model, the government is
not able to control the pharmaceutical company’s intention of earlier investment
due to uncertainty. The only thing that can be observed is the exact investment
timing because the different objectives of the two parties, the advance purchase
commitments contract, does not lead to the first-best outcome in terms of social
welfare.
This is similar to the moral hazard problem when the principal is not able to
observe the effort of the agent but only the outcomes (Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005)), though the outcomes are merely noisy signal of effort. Hence the principal
will need to incentivize the agent to exert more effort by designing an effective
managerial incentive schemes. Similarly, in our model, the government will also
need to incentivize the pharmaceutical company to start the project earlier by altering
the quality standard of the project or the remuneration level. More importantly, we
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show that uncertainty, like asymmetric information, will also lead to a sub-optimal
outcome in a two-parties contract.
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Chapter 3
Basic Tools from Real Options
Theory
3.1 Probability Spaces and Filtrations
In this chapter we review some basic concepts from probability theory and the basic
tools from the real options theory that have been used in the thesis.
To start with, the probability spaces are first defined, in which the stochastic
processes, expectations and probability measures that have been used in the thesis
are dependent on.
Definition 3.1.1 (Oksendal (2013)) If Ω is a given set, then a σ -algebraF on Ω is
a familyF of subsets of Ω with the following properties:
(a) /0 ∈F
(b) F ∈F =⇒ Fc ∈F , where Fc=Ω\F is the complement of F in Ω
(c) A1,A2... ∈F =⇒ A :=
∞⋃
i=1
Ai ∈F
The pair (Ω,F ) is called a measurable space. A probability measure P on a mea-
surable space (Ω,F ) is a function P :F −→ [0,1] such that
(a) P( /0) = 0,P(Ω) = 1
(b) if A1,A2... ∈F and {Ai}∞i=1 is disjoint (i.e. Ai∩A j = /0 if i ̸= j) then
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P
(
∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
=
∞
∑
i=1
Ai. (3.1)
The triple (Ω,F ,P) is called a probability space.
Definition 3.1.2 Given a measurable space (Ω,F ), a filtration is a sequence of
σ -algebras {Ft}t≥0 withFt ⊆F where each t is a non-negative real number and
t1 ≤ t2 =⇒ Ft1 ⊆Ft2 .
The filtration at time t represents all the historical information available at time t.
3.2 Brownian Motion
The Brownian Motion is often used to develop models for a decision making process
in which action is taken when a threshold criterion level is reached. Moreover,
Brownian Motion acts as random part of the stochastic processes such as Arithmetic
Brownian Motion (ABM) and Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), which are
widely used to model different uncertainties in the investment problems.
Definition 3.2.1 (Billingsley (1995)) A Brownian motion or Wiener process is a
stochastic process [Wt : t ≥ 0], on some (Ω,F ,P), with the three properties:
(a) The process starts at 0: P[W0 = 0] = 1.
(b) The increments are independent: If 0≤ t0 ≤ t1 ≤ ...≤ tk, then
P[Wti −Wti−1 ∈ Hi, i≤ k] =∏
i≤k
P[Wti −Wti−1 ∈ Hi]. (3.2)
(c) For 0 ≤ s < t the increment Wt −Ws is normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance t− s:
P[Wt −Ws ∈ H] = 1√
2π(t− s)
∫
H
e−x
2/2(t−s)dx. (3.3)
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Note that the notation Wt is often interchangeable with Bt .
3.3 Ito Diffusions, Ito’s Lemma and Geometric Brow-
nian Motion (GBM)
Definition 3.3.1 (Thijssen (2013b)) The stochastic process (Yt)t≥0, where for each
t > 0 , is
Yt = y+
∫ t
0
µ(s,Ys)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,Ys)dBs, Y0 = y, Ps−a.s., (3.4)
and (Bt)t≥0 is a Brownian motion. Processes as in Equation 3.4 are called (Ito)
diffusions.
In differential notation we can write
dYt = µ(t,Yt)dt+σ(t,Y )dBt . (3.5)
An equation of the form (Equation 3.5) is also called a stochastic differential
equation (SDE), the function µ(·) is the trend and σ(·) is the volatility. If the trend
and volatility do not depend on t, the diffusion is time homogeneous.
Ito’s Lemma is of great importance in the Ito Calculus and it can be used to
compute the derivative of a time-dependent function of a stochastic process. It plays
the role of the chain rule in a stochastic setting, similar to the chain rule in ordinary
differential calculus. In the thesis, we model the uncertainty in the investment
problems by using stochastic processes that the NPV functions and the functions of
project values are dependent on. Ito’s Lemma can be used to calculate the change of
NPV or project values within an infinite small amount of time for any given time.
This is crucial in real options analysis since decision makers will need to compare
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the NPV and option value of waiting as time goes by, so that an optimal investment
decision can be made.
Definition 3.3.2 (Thijssen (2013b)) Ito’s Lemma. Let (Yt)t≥0 follow an Ito diffusion
and let Xt = g(t,Yt), with g being a twice continuously differentiable function. Then
dXt =
∂g(·)
∂ t
dt+
∂g(·)
∂Yt
dYt +
1
2
∂ 2g(·)
∂Y 2t
dY 2t
=
[
∂g(·)
∂ t
+
∂g(·)
∂Yt
µ(·)+ 1
2
∂ 2g(·)
∂Y 2t
σ(·)2
]
dt+
∂g(·)
∂Yt
σ(·)dBt .
(3.6)
Geometric Brownian Motion is used in the thesis to model the uncertainties in
such as revenues and quality of drugs, which are assumed to be non-negative.
Definition 3.3.3 A Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) Yt is the solution of an SDE
with linear drift and diffusion coefficients, i.e.
dYt = µYtdt+σYtdBt , (3.7)
with initial value Y0 = y.
3.4 Stopping Time
Definition 3.4.1 (Oksendal (2013)) LetNt be an increasing family of σ -algebras
(of subsets of Ω). A function Ω→ [0,∞] is called a (strict) stopping time w.r.t. Nt if
{ω;τ(ω)≤ t} ∈Nt , f or all t ≥ 0. (3.8)
In other words, it should be possible to decide whether or not τ ≤ t has occurred on
the basis of the knowledge ofNt .
For instance, if a firm decides to invest as soon as some pre-determined threshold
(or “trigger”) Y ∗ is reached, then the (random) time at which investment takes place
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is the first hitting time
τ(Y ∗) = inf{t ≥ 0 | Yt ≥ Y ∗,Y0 = y}, (3.9)
which is a stopping time.
3.5 The Generator of a Diffusion and Dynkin’s For-
mula
Definition 3.5.1 (Oksendal (2013)) Let Yt be a (time-homogeneous) Ito diffusion in
Rn. The (infinitesimal) generator A of Yt is defined by
A f (y) = lim
t→0
Ey [ f (Yt)]− f (y)
t
; y ∈ Rn (3.10)
The set of functions f : Rn → R such that the limit exists at y is denoted by DA(y),
while DA denotes the set of functions for which the limit exists for all y ∈ Rn.
Another operator which is closely related to the generator A, but is more suitable in
many situations, is the characteristic operator of the diffusion process (Yt)t≥0. In
the thesis, Yt follows GBM, if there exists a function f ⊂C 2, the generator A is equal
to the characteristic operator which is denoted by L . Expand the characteristic
operator by using Ito’s Lemma, we have
AY =LY =
1
2
σ2y2
∂ 2
∂y2
+µy
∂
∂y
. (3.11)
The characteristic operator of a diffusion process can be used to compute the value
of waiting within an infinite small amount of time in the real options analysis.
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Definition 3.5.2 (Oksendal (2013)) Dynkin’s formula. Let f ∈ C 20 (Rn). Suppose τ
is a stopping time, Ey [τ]< ∞. Then
Ey [ f (Yτ)] = f (y)+Ey
[∫ τ
o
A f (Ys)ds
]
. (3.12)
Dynkin’s formula is used in the thesis to calculate the expected discount factor at the
optimal investment timing, when the underlying stochastic process (Yt)t≥0 follows
GBM.
(Thijssen (2013b))In the models, we will often need to compute Ey [e−ρτF(Yτ)],
for some stopping time τ and a discount rate ρ , where F is an increasing and concave
C 2 function.
Define the process (Xt)t≥0 by
Xt =
s+ t
Yt

and for any function g ∈ C 2 ([0,∞)×E), the generator of g equals
LX g =
∂g
∂ t
+
1
2
σ2y2
∂ 2g
∂y2
+µy
∂g
∂y
. (3.13)
It follows that for g(t,y) = e−ρtF(y) we get:
LX g =e−ρt
(
1
2
σ2y2
∂ 2F
∂y2
+µy
∂F
∂y
−ρF
)
=e−ρt (LY F−ρF) . (3.14)
Dynkin’s formula then gives
Ey
[
e−ρτF(Yτ)
]
= F(y)+Ey
[∫ τ
0
e−ρt (LY F(Yt)−ρF(Yt))dt
]
. (3.15)
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If LY F(Yt)−ρF(Yt) = 0 holds and ϕ(·) is known to be the general solution, the
expected discounted factor can be computed as
Ey
[
e−ρτ
]
=
ϕ(y)
ϕ(Yτ)
. (3.16)
It is worth noting that the above equation is not specific to Geometric Brownian
Motion (GBM), it is a generalized result which can be applied to any stochastic
processes. However, for other stochastic processes that are not GBM, one cannot
guarantee that ϕ(·), which solves the PDE in equation (3.13), has a closed form
solution. Thus the expected discount factor may not be computed. For GBM, the
functional form of the solution to equation (3.13) is known, which enables us to
further calculate the expected discount factor.
3.6 Markov Property and Strong Markov Property
Definition 3.6.1 (Oksendal (2013)) Markov property. Let f be a bounded Borel
function from Rn to R. Then, for t,h≥ 0
Ex
[
f (Xt+h) |F (m)t
]
(ω)
= EXt(ω) [ f (Xh)] . (3.17)
Definition 3.6.2 (Oksendal (2013)) Strong Markov property. Let f be a bounded
Borel function on Rn, τ a stopping time w.r.t. F(m)t , τ < ∞ a.s. Then
Ex
[
f (Xτ+h) |F (m)τ
]
= EXτ [ f (Xh)] for all h≥ 0. (3.18)
The uncertainties of the investment problems in the thesis are modeled by GBM.
Moreover, GBM is Markovian which satisfies the above two properties which makes
the computation much easier. For instance, if the decision maker, at time s > 0,
wants to compute the expected project value at time t > s, because of the Markovian
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property of GBM, the decision maker may treat time t as the new start and compute
the project value at time t then discount it back to time s.
3.7 Law of Iterated Expectation
Definition 3.7.1 (Billingsley (1995)) If X is integrable and the σ -fields G1 and G2
satisfy G1 ⊂ G2, then
E[E[X | G2] | G1] = E[X | G1] (3.19)
3.8 Poisson Process
Let (T0,T1, ...) be a strictly increasing sequence of stopping times, in a sense that
for any i, j ∈ N with i < j, Ti < Tj a.s., with T0 = 0. Define the indicator function
1{t≥Tn} =

1 i f t ≥ Tn(ω)
0 i f t < Tn(ω).
(3.20)
Definition 3.8.1 (Thijssen (2013b)) The counting process associated with the se-
quence (T0,T1, ...) is the process (Nt)t≥0 defined by Nt = ∑n≥0 1{t≥Tn}. Note that
(Nt)t≥0 takes values in {0,1,2, ...}. Let T := supTn. We say that (Nt)t≥0 is a
counting process without explosions if T = ∞, P-a.s.
Definition 3.8.2 A counting process without explosions is a Poisson process if
(1) Nt −Ns is independent of Ns, for all s < t;
(2) for any s < t and u < v, with t− s = v−u it holds that Nt−Ns and Nv−Nu have
the same distribution.
The Poisson process is used to model the sudden success of the pharmaceutical
R&D project in chapter 6.
42
Chapter 4
The Effect of Commercialization
Flexibility and Investment Lag on
Pharmaceutical Investment
Decisions under Uncertainty
4.1 Abstract
This chapter studies the evaluation of irreversible pharmaceutical R&D projects
and optimal exercise of the options to defer investment and commercialization
in the presence of stochastic payoffs and investment lag. Two pharmaceutical
R&D projects, with and without commercialization flexibility, are analyzed and
compared. The project with commercialization flexibility is modeled as a compound
option, which is composed of an option to defer starting the R&D process and an
option to defer commercialization, with the investment lag in the R&D process.
Thus the revenues are not necessarily generated after construction being finished,
which is usually assumed in the literature. We find that, although a project with
commercialization flexibility has a higher project value, it does not provide with
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more investment incentives when uncertainty is high. In addition, the fast approval
policy is more effective in terms of shortening the time for new drugs to be on the
market only when uncertainty is low.
4.2 Introduction
The development of modern medical science has helped to cure many diseases that
were once considered as “the incurables” such as Smallpox and the Black Death.
However, when facing diseases such as cancer, AIDS and Avian flu, which have
been claiming thousands of lives, we still strive to develop new technologies and
look for better solutions. One of the approaches that have been discussed widely
in the literature on how to satisfy the clinical needs for these patients earlier is by
shortening the approval process.
In 1992, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) initiated the FDA Accel-
erated Approval Program to allow faster approval of drugs for serious conditions that
fill an unmet medical need.1 In April 2014, the Medicines and Healthcare products
Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in the UK launched the Early Access to Medicines
Scheme (EAMS) in order to give patients with life threatening or seriously debilitat-
ing conditions access to medicines that do not yet have a marketing authorization
and where there are no suitable alternative licensed treatments.2
However, from the perspective of a pharmaceutical company who provides
profitability, is it an optimal strategy to launch and start selling the new drug as soon
as the products are approved? By looking at the top 10 blockbuster drugs launched
in US from 2010-2013, it is found that half of the pharmaceutical companies (8/18)
chose to launch the new drugs as soon as their products were approved3, while the
other half of the companies (7/18) delayed the launch, including Lipitor and Plavix,
1http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/HealthProfessionals/ucm313768.htm
2http://www.mhra.gov.uk/Howweregulate/Innovation/EarlyaccesstomedicinesschemeEAMS/index.htm
3The time between approval and launch is less than a month. The approval dates are collected
from FDA’s website http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm and the start
dates of drugs are collected by the annual reports of each pharmaceutical companies that produced
them. Among all the drugs, the launch dates of 3/18 drugs cannot be found
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of which sales ranked 1 and 2 in 2010. In this chapter, we explain the behaviors of
the companies by using real options theory to model a pharmaceutical investment
and commercialized decision.
Following Myers (1977), it is quite natural to think of many investment problems
that feature irreversibility, flexibility and uncertainty as real options. Many R&D
projects can be fitted in this framework since they exhibit these features. First, the
cost spent on developing a drug is usually high and irreversible since it will not be
recovered if the research turns out to be a failure or the project is abandoned. Second,
most of the decisions do not have to be made abruptly. Waiting to decide while
collecting useful information will be a better choice. Last, the payoffs of projects
are usually full of uncertainties in that the price and demand of drugs are usually
not known ex ante. Because of these features, initiating the project at different time
will lead to huge differences on the potential profits.
The evaluation of a pharmaceutical R&D project by using real options theory
is not new in the literature. For instance, Schwartz and Moon (1996) discuss the
evaluation of a pharmaceutical R&D project when both cost and the completed
value of the project are uncertain. Hsu and Schwartz (2008) studies the problem of
under-investment in R&D for vaccines in the developing countries and the design of
research incentives.
An additional feature for many pharmaceutical R&D projects is that it often
takes a long time, 8-14 years average, to complete the R&D process before approval
and commercialization (DiMasi et al. 2003). In real options literature, the duration
of time between the start and completion of a project is called the investment lag,
delivery lag or implementation lag 4, which has been used to model construction
delays in many papers. Alvarez and Keppo (2002) consider a model of investment
where investment lag is dependent on the underlying stochastic process. They
find that the impact of delivery lag on investment is negative. In other words, an
increase in the investment lag delays investment. Sarkar and Zhang (2013) argue
4Investment lag was used by Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996), delivery lag was used by Alvarez and
Keppo (2002) and implementation lag was used by Sarkar and Zhang (2013). These terms can be
used interchangeably.
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that the conventional result “increase in uncertainty and investment lag should
have inhibiting effect on investment” can be reversed if the project has sufficient
reversibility. Majd and Pindyck (1987) and Pindyck (1993) discuss two models that
take time to build where the firms can invest at some maximum rate and abandon the
projects in the mid stream. The difference is the former paper introduce uncertainty
in the value of the completed project where the latter in the cost. Thijssen (2015)
proposed a model that can be used to value especially large-scale infrastructure
projects, where the revenue process and construction process are possibly correlated.
However, the decisions in the papers mentioned above are either “once-and-for-
all” type decisions (see Alvarez and Keppo (2002)) or composed of the abandonment
options in the mid stream or at the completion of the projects. Moreover, these papers
assume that the revenues or the salvage value will be generated at the completion of
the project (see Sarkar and Zhang 2013).
In this chapter, we model an R&D project with investment lag and commercial-
ization flexibility. Thus the revenues are not necessarily generated as soon as the
R&D process is completed. The payoffs of the project are modeled by a stochastic
process (Yt)t≥0 that follows Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). Dependent on
the value of the stochastic process at the end of the R&D process, the decision
maker will consider whether to start commercialization immediately or delay it. If
commercialization is delayed, the revenues will also be generated later.
Since starting the R&D process is a prerequisite of acquiring the option to
launch the products afterwards, the decision maker’s problem can be considered
as a compound option. Methodologically, the major contribution of this chapter is
to model an R&D project by combining a compound option with investment lag.
The combination of the two problems further increases the difficulty of making
an optimal investment decision under uncertainty since the expected NPV of the
project are influenced in both directions. First, the investment lag will increase
the discounting on future payoffs, which reduces the NPV of the project. A lower
NPV will lead to a higher investment threshold. Second, the investment lag will
have effects on the probability that the commercialization process will take place,
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which may increase the NPV of the project and lead to a lower investment threshold.
Last, an increase in the investment lag will increase the option value of waiting
if the volatility of the stochastic process (Yt)t≥0 is high which will lead to a high
investment threshold. Hence the effect of investment lag on option value is not clear.
The interactions of these effects make the evaluation of a project more difficult.
There are three major findings of this chapter. First, the project with commercial-
ization flexibility performs better when uncertainty is low since both the probabilities
of investment and commercialization taking place are higher. Second, the project
without commercialization flexibility is better in terms of sooner investment and
commercialization when uncertainty is high. Last, fast approval, which is modeled
by shortening the investment lag, is a better policy when uncertainty is low.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.3 introduces the
model without commercialization flexibility. Section 4.4 discusses the model with
commercialization flexibility. In section 4.5, the two projects are compared. Section
4.6 considers policy implications. Finally, section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.3 The Project with Immediate Commercialization
It is worth noting that the following model and results are not new in the real options
literature. They serve as benchmarks in order to compare with the model and results
in section 4.4. The model can be considered as a simplified version of the model
of Alvarez and Keppo (2002), when the sunk cost is paid when the investment
takes place and when the investment lag is a known constant instead of a function
dependent on the underlying stochastic process.
Consider a pharmaceutical company that is provided with the opportunity to
invest in a drug development project with uncertain revenues. The first, R&D, phase
of the project, starts when the cost flow CR commences. The second, commercializa-
tion, phase of the project, starts when the new drug is approved, which we assume
happens after a known, fixed time T ∗. As soon as the drug is approved and ready to
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launch, the company will start selling it immediately by paying a sunk cost Ic > 0
with revenues being generated at this point.
The time line of the project is as follows
0
Now
t
Cost incurred.
R&D starts
t+T ∗
New drug approved.
Commercialization starts
R&D process
Uncertainty in revenues is represented by a stochastic process (Yt)t≥0, which
follows a geometric Brownian motion
dYt = µYtdt+σYtdBt , (4.1)
where (Bt)t≥0 is a Wiener process. We assume that the initial value is known with
Y0 = y. The probability measure over the sample paths of (Yt)t≥0 is denoted by Py.
It is assumed that the decision maker is risk neutral and ρ > 0 is the discount rate.
When the new drug is available to sell at the end of the R&D process, the decision
maker will start the commercialization process immediately by paying a sunk cost
Ic in return for a stream of revenues. The expected profit of commercialization is
Fc(y) = Ey
(∫ ∞
0
e−ρtYtdt
)
− Ic
=
y
ρ−µ − Ic, (4.2)
where Ey is the expectation operator under the probability measure Py. In addition,
we assume that ρ > µ , to ensure finiteness of Fc(y). To simplify the problem, we
also assume the operating cost of commercialization process is 0. However, the
following results will not lose generality if operating cost is added since it can be
considered as part of the sunk cost.
At time 0, the problem of the decision maker is to find the optimal stopping
time τ1 to start the project. Since Fc(Yt+T ∗) is a random variable at time t, the
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problem faced by the decision maker is to optimally stop the expected profit of
commercialization EYt [Fc(Yt+T ∗)], net of R&D costs. That is, the decision maker
needs to solve the optimal stopping problem
G(y) =sup
τ1
Ey
[
−
∫ τ1+T ∗
τ1
e−ρtCRdt+ e−ρ(τ1+T
∗)
(
Yτ1+T ∗
ρ−µ − Ic
)]
=sup
τ1
Ey
{
e−ρτ1
[
e−ρT
∗
EYτ1
[
Yτ1+T ∗
ρ−µ − Ic
]
− cR(1− e
−ρT ∗)
ρ
]}
≡sup
τ1
Ey
[
e−ρτ1g(Yτ1)
]
, (4.3)
where
g(y) =
ye−(ρ−µ)T ∗
ρ−µ − Ice
−ρT ∗− cR(1− e
−ρT ∗)
ρ
. (4.4)
As is well-known, for this type of problem, the optimal stopping time takes
the form of the first hitting time of some threshold Y ∗, i.e., τ(Y ∗) = inf{t ≥ 0 |
Yt ≥ Y ∗,Y0 = y}. (Basically, because of the Markovian nature of the process and
monotonicity of g in y.) In addition, the space [0,∞] can be divided into two regions
by the critical value Y ∗. In [0,Y ∗), continuation (waiting) is optimal since the value
of investing immediately is less than the value of waiting. In [Y ∗,∞], termination
(invest immediately) is optimal since the value of investing immediately exceeds
the value of waiting. Hence [0,Y ∗) is called the continuation region while [Y ∗,∞] is
called the stopping region (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). Thus, instead of solving the
optimal stopping problem in equation 4.3, we can compute the optimal investment
threshold Y ∗ by rewriting the problem above as
G(y) = sup
Y ∗
Ey
[
e−ρτ1(Y
∗)g(Yτ1(Y ∗))
]
= sup
Y ∗
Ey
[
e−ρτ1(Y
∗)
]
g(Y ∗). (4.5)
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The characteristic operator of the process (Yt)t≥0 is
LY =
1
2
σ2y2
∂ 2
∂y2
+µy
∂
∂y
. (4.6)
Since the Bellman equation holds in the continuation region, i.e.,LY G = ρG.
By substituting the expression of the characteristic operator and rearranging, we
have
1
2
σ2y2
∂ 2G
∂y2
+µy
∂G
∂y
−ρG = 0, (4.7)
of which the general solution is of the form
G(y) = Ayβ1 +Byβ2, (4.8)
where β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are the two roots of the quadratic equation
Q(β ) =
1
2
σ2β (β −1)+µβ −ρ = 0. (4.9)
The boundary condition G(0) = 0 is satisfied only if B = 0. Thus the general
solution of the value function is reduced to be G(y) = Ayβ1 on (0,Y ∗).
By using Dynkin’s formula (Oksendal (2013)), the expected discount factor is
Ey
[
e−ρτ(Y
∗)
]
=
G(y)
G(Y ∗)
=
( y
Y ∗
)β1
. (4.10)
The optimal investment threshold Y ∗ can be obtained by substituting the expected
discount factor Ey
[
e−ρτ(Y ∗)
]
in equation 4.10 with the result in Equation 4.5 and
taking the first order derivatives of the value function G(y) with respect to Y ∗
G(Y ∗)g′(Y ∗) = G′(Y ∗)g(Y ∗), (4.11)
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and
Y ∗ =
β1
β1−1(ρ−µ)e
(ρ−µ)T ∗
(
Ice−ρT
∗
+
cR(1− e−ρT ∗)
ρ
)
. (4.12)
In particular, if there is no investment lag, i.e., T ∗ = 0,
Y ∗ =
β1
β1−1(ρ−µ)Ic, (4.13)
which is the standard investment threshold in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
Dependent on the current value of y, the value of the project is
G(y) =

( y
Y ∗
)β1(Y ∗e−(ρ−µ)T∗
ρ−µ − Ice−ρT
∗− cR(1−e−ρT
∗
)
ρ
)
i f y < Y ∗
ye−(ρ−µ)T∗
ρ−µ − Ice−ρT
∗− cR(1−e−ρT
∗
)
ρ i f y≥ Y ∗.
(4.14)
The value of the project with immediately commercialization at any point in
time is dependent on the value of the stochastic process (Yt)t≥0, which represents the
revenue of the product at that time. If the project’s revenue is less than the optimal
investment threshold Y ∗, the best strategy is to wait and only pay the sunk cost as
soon as Y ∗ is reached. If the project’s revenue is greater or equal to the optimal
investment threshold Y ∗, the best strategy is to invest and start the R&D process
immediately.
4.4 The Project with Commercialization Flexibility
In section 4.3, we discussed a project assuming that the pharmaceutical company
starts commercialization immediately after the R&D process finishes. Now, we
relax this assumption by providing commercialization flexibility at the approval date
so that the decision maker is allowed to delay commercialization. In this case, two
decisions will need to be made by the decision maker, which are the optimal time (i)
to start the project and (ii) to commence commercialization.
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By offering the commercialization flexibility, the time line of the project is as
follows:
0
Now
tR
Cost incurred.
R&D starts
tR+T ∗
Drug approved.
Commercializa-
tion may start or
not
tR+T ∗+ tc
commercialization
may start
here
R&D process Flexibility
The problem of the decision maker now is to maximize the expected discounted
net present value of the project when she has both the option to defer the decision of
investment and the option to defer commercialization. The problem can be solved
by backwards induction.
Suppose that the R&D process is finished and that the new drug is ready for
commercialization, the expected revenues net of associated sunk costs of the com-
mercialization process is
Fc(y) := Ey
(∫ ∞
0
e−ρtYtdt− Ic
)
=
y
ρ−µ − Ic. (4.15)
The value of the commercialization process is determined by the solution to the
associated optimal stopping problem. As in the previous section, the optimal policy
is of the threshold type, so that we can write
F∗c (y) := sup
τ
Ey
[
e−ρτF(Yτ)
]
= sup
Y ∗c
Ey
[
e−ρτ(Y
∗
c )F(Yτ(Y ∗c ))
]
= sup
Y ∗c
Ey
[
e−ρτ(Y
∗
c )
]
F(Y ∗c ). (4.16)
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Following the same approach as in section 4.3, we are able to compute the
threshold for commercialization as
Y ∗c =
β1
β1−1(ρ−µ)Ic. (4.17)
The value function of the commercialization option is
F∗c (y) =

( y
Y ∗c
)β1( Y ∗c
ρ−µ − Ic
)
i f y < Y ∗c
y
ρ−µ − Ic i f y≥ Y ∗c .
(4.18)
In what follows, the two terms
(
y
Y ∗c
)β1 ( Y ∗c
ρ−µ − Ic
)
and yρ−µ − Ic in the value
function above will be used frequently. For simplicity, define C(y;Y ∗c )=
( y
Y ∗c
)β1( Y ∗c
ρ−µ −
Ic
)
and D(y) = yρ−µ − Ic. If R&D starts at time t, then, Yt+T ∗ is a random variable
that is notFt measurable. In other words, the exact values of C(Yt+T ∗ ;Y ∗c ), D(Yt+T ∗)
and F∗c (Yt+T ∗) are unknown with the information up to time t. So, to evaluate the
option to invest in R&D, the decision maker must rely on the conditional expecta-
tions EYt
(
C(Yt+T ∗;Y ∗c )|Yt+T ∗ < Y ∗c
)
, EYt
(
D(Yt+T ∗)|Yt+T ∗ ≥ Y ∗c
)
and EYt [F
∗
c (Yt+T ∗)],
which are given by
Lemma 4.1
EYt
(
C(Yt+T ∗;Y ∗c )|Yt+T ∗ < Y ∗c
)
= (Yt)β1e[µβ1+
1
2σ
2β1(β1−1)]T ∗(Y ∗c )
−β1
(
Y ∗c
ρ−µ − Ic
)
(4.19)
and
EYt
(
D(Yt+T ∗)|Yt+T ∗ ≥ Y ∗c
)
=
YteµT
∗
ρ−µ − Ic. (4.20)
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Since F∗c (Yt+T ∗) is a random variable at time t, by the law of total expectation,
the expected value is
EYt [F
∗
c (Yt+T ∗)] = [EYt (C(Yt+T ∗;Y
∗
c )|Yt+T ∗ < Y ∗c )]PYt (Yt+T ∗ < Y ∗c )
+ [EYt (D(Yt+T ∗)|Yt+T ∗ ≥ Y ∗c )]PYt (Yt+T ∗ ≥ Y ∗c ). (4.21)
The two probabilities PYt (Yt+T ∗ < Y
∗
c ) and PYt (Yt+T ∗ ≥ Y ∗c ) in the above equa-
tions are
PYt (Yt+T ∗ < Y
∗
c ) = PYt (
log(Yt+T∗Yt )− (µ− 12σ2)T ∗
σ
√
T ∗
<
log(Y
∗
c
Yt
)− (µ− 12σ2)T ∗
σ
√
T ∗
)
(4.22)
and
PYt (Yt+T ∗ ≥ Y ∗c ) = 1−PYt (Yt+T ∗ < Y ∗c ). (4.23)
See proof of the lemma in the Appendix.
After computing the expected NPV of the commercialization process, the deci-
sion maker needs to find the optimal time to start the R&D process. The correspond-
ing optimal stopping problem is
F∗R (y) = sup
τ1
Ey
{
e−ρτ1
[
e−ρT
∗
EYτ1 [F
∗
c (Yτ1+T ∗)]−
cR(1− e−ρT ∗)
ρ
]}
≡ sup
τ1
Ey
[
e−ρτ1 fR(Yτ1)
]
, (4.24)
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where
fR(Yτ1) = e
−ρT ∗
[
EYτ1 (C(Yτ1+T ∗;Y
∗
c |Yτ1+T ∗ < Y ∗c )PYτ1 (Yτ1+T ∗ < Y ∗c )
+EYτ1 (D(Yτ1+T ∗|Yτ1+T ∗ ≥ Y ∗c )PYτ1 (Yτ1+T ∗ ≥ Y ∗c )
]
− cR(1− e
−ρT ∗)
ρ
.
(4.25)
The above problem is closely related to the one proposed by Alvarez and Keppo
(2002). In their model, the investment lag T ∗ is assumed to be a function of the
revenue process, and payoffs are received at the end of the lag. While the investment
lag is an exogenously given constant in our problem and the project is considered
as a compound option because of commercialization flexibility. To maximize the
value of the project, both investment and commercialization decisions will need to
be taken into account simultaneously.
Conjecture 4.1 There exists a unique investment threshold Yˆ that maximizes the
value of the project with commercialization flexibility. This threshold Yˆ satisfies
F∗R (Yˆ ) f
′
R(Yˆ ) = (F
∗
R (Yˆ ))
′ fR(Yˆ ). (4.26)
To prove the existence and uniqueness in the above conjecture, the sign of “ f ′(y)”
(see equation (4.41) in the Appendix) must be determined. The first and second order
derivatives of the NPV function for the project that has commercialization flexibility
(equation (4.25)) with respect to “y” are the keys to determine the sign. However, due
to the complicated functional form of the NPV function, it is impossible to calculate
these derivatives. The existence of the investment threshold in the conjecture is based
on numerical methods and the uniqueness is based on induction. (see Appendix)
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4.5 Comparison of Projects with and without Com-
mercialization Flexibility
Four problems are focused on during the comparisons. First, we discuss how in-
vestment thresholds in each project vary with uncertainty σ for different investment
lags. Second, we compare how investment thresholds of the two projects vary with
uncertainty σ for the same investment lag. Third, to find out which project provides
pharmaceutical companies with more incentives to start the R&D process earlier,
we compute the probabilities of investments taking place within T years for the two
projects. Last, to find out when the products will be available on the market, we
calculate the probabilities that commercialization will start at the end of the R&D
process.
Figure 4.1 shows how investment thresholds in each project vary with uncertainty
for different investment lags. We first compare the investment thresholds within
each project.
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Fig. 4.1 Comparison for the investment thresholds Y ∗ and Yˆ vary with respect to
uncertainty σ for different investment lags for each projects. Yˆ and Y ∗ represent the
investment thresholds of the project with and without commercialization flexibility
respectively. The parameter values are: the discount rate ρ = 0.05, the growth rate
µ = 0.03, the sunk cost for commercialization Ic = 0.5, the cost flows per period
during the R&D process cR = 0.05, the uncertainty σ ranges from 0.001 to 0.9 and
the investment lag T ∗ ranges from 5 to 15.
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In figure 4.1 (a) and (b) respectively, we notice that the investment thresholds
with larger investment lag always dominate the one with smaller investment lag.
Intuitively, there are two reasons. First, since it is assumed the costs of the project
are paid per period, a larger investment lag or longer R&D process ends up with
higher overall costs which reduces the NPV of the investment. In this case, a higher
investment threshold is needed to ensure a positive NPV of the project. Moreover,
future revenues will be discounted more heavily with a larger investment lag in
both projects, which also reduces the NPV of the investments. Second, a higher
investment lag T ∗ leads to higher uncertainty in the value of Yt at the time of
approval. For the project with commercialization flexibility, the option value of
commercialization process also increases with higher uncertainty. Both the decrease
of NPV and the increase in the option value contribute to a higher investment
threshold.
Next, this thesis addresses the second problem by comparing the evolution of
investment thresholds between projects in Figure 4.2. In figure (A), the investment
threshold of the project with commercialization flexibility is strictly below the other
one when the investment lag is 5 years. However, as the investment lag T ∗ increases
from 5 to 7 years, as shown in figure (B), the two thresholds cross out each other
when σ is between 0.8 and 0.9. In figure (C) and figure (D), as T ∗ further increases,
the thresholds cross out even sooner when σ is between 0.6 and 0.7.
Before discussing why the thresholds vary in this way, three facts need to be
mentioned. (1) The NPV of the project with commercialization flexibility is always
greater or equal to the NPV of the project without commercialization flexibility. (2)
There are two options in the project with commercialization flexibility, which are
the option to defer investment, and the option to defer commercialization; but there
is only one option in the project without commercialization flexibility, which is to
defer investment. (3) The increase in the uncertainty σ will not influence the NPV
of the project with immediate commercialization, while it has effects on the NPV
of the project that has commercialization flexibility, since the expected revenues
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are only dependent on the growth rate of the stochastic process due to the fact that
EYt (Yt+T ∗) = Yte
µT ∗ .
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Fig. 4.2 Comparison for the investment thresholds for different projects with dif-
ferent investment lags. Yˆ and Y ∗ represent the investment thresholds of the project
with and without commercialization flexibility respectively. The parameter values
are: the discount rate ρ = 0.05, the growth rate µ = 0.03, the sunk cost for commer-
cialization Ic = 0.5, the cost flows per period during the R&D process cR = 0.05,
the uncertainties σ range from 0.001 to 0.9 and the investment lag T ∗ range from 5
to 15.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the above facts. The first conclusion is
when uncertainty σ = 0, the investment thresholds of both projects are equal. In this
case, the commercialization flexibility does not provide with additional value to the
project since the expected value of the commercialization process at the approval
date is certain. Without uncertainty, the only choice that the investor has is to start
the commercialization process right after approval without further delay. Hence the
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optimal investment strategy is to invest when NPV>0 since further waiting will only
lead to lower overall NPV due to the assumption of r > µ .
The second conclusion is when the investment lag T ∗ is small and as uncertainty
σ goes up, the investment threshold of the project that has commercialization flexi-
bility Yˆ increases slower than the threshold of the project without commercialization
flexibility. For the project without commercialization flexibility, the increase in σ
leads to higher option value while the expected NPV of the project stays the same.
Thus the investment threshold of the project goes up.
For the project with commercialization flexibility, an increase in σ does not
only increase the value of waiting before investment due to higher volatility of
the underlying stochastic process, but also because of the increased NPV of the
commercialization process since uncertainty makes the commercialization flexibility
valuable. However, since the investment lag T ∗ is low, for the same length of waiting,
for example, Tw years, as σ goes up, the option value increases slower than NPV
because the option value of waiting is based on the value of Yt on time Tw +T ∗.
More specifically, when T ∗ is much lower than Tw, as σ goes up, the gain from the
option value is relatively lower. Since NPV increases faster while the option value
increases slower, the investment threshold goes up slower than the one of the project
without commercialization flexibility.
The third conclusion is the investment threshold of the project that has com-
mercialization flexibility Yˆ increases faster as uncertainty σ goes up with higher
investment lag T ∗. This conclusion also results from the balance of the NPV and
the option value. For the project with immediate commercialization, an increase in
σ will increase the option value of investment, which is the same as it is when T ∗
is small. For the other project, a higher T ∗ will increase the volatility of Yt at the
approval date, thus the option value of commercialization process also increases. As
σ goes up, on one hand, the NPV of the project increases. On the other hand, the
option value also increases but it increases faster than the NPV of the project. The
reason is, when T ∗ is larger, for the same length of waiting, for example, Tw years,
as σ goes up, the volatility of Yt which is based on time Tw+T ∗, is much higher.
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When T ∗ is much higher than Tw, as σ goes up, the gain from the option value is also
higher. Since the option value increases faster than NPV, the investment threshold
goes up faster than the one of the project without commercialization flexibility.
The third problem that we discuss is which project provides investors with more
incentives to start the R&D process earlier. This can be done by either comparing
the value of the investment thresholds of the two projects, or more intuitively, by
computing the probabilities of investment taking place within a certain amount of
time.
Letting µ¯ = µ− 12σ2, the probability that Y ∗ is reached within T period equals
(Harrison, 1985)
Py
(
sup
0≤t≤T
Yt ≥ Y ∗
)
=Φ
− log
(
Y ∗
y
)
+ µ¯T
σ
√
T
+(Y ∗
y
) 2µ¯
σ2
Φ
− log
(
Y ∗
y
)
− µ¯T
σ
√
T
 ,
(4.27)
whereΦ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
and y the initial value of the process (Yt)t≥0.
For a given volatility, lower investment thresholds are equivalent to earlier
investments taking place within certain period. The numerical results show that
when σ ranges from 0.2 to 0.6, the project with commercialization flexibility
has a higher probability of starting the project than the project with immediate
commercialization. However, when σ ranges from 0.7 to 0.9, the values of the two
probabilities are reversed.
Lastly, we discuss the probability of the commercialization process taking place
by the end of the R&D process. For the project without commercialization flexibility,
the probability that the commercialization starts at the end of the R&D process is 1.
For the project with commercialization flexibility, we simulate 300,000 sample paths
of the underlying stochastic process (Yt)t≥0, by choosing the optimal investment
threshold Yˆ as the initial value. Y ∗c , the optimal commercialization threshold and
YtR+T ∗ , the value of stochastic process T
∗ years after starting at Yˆ , are compared.
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The probability of immediate commercialization at the end of the commercialization
process is computed as the number of sample paths that end up with YtR+T ∗ ≥ Y ∗c
divided by 300,000, the total number of simulation. And the probability of delaying
commercialization is 1− (the probability of immediate commercialization).
How the probabilities change with respect to uncertainty σ and T ∗ are shown
in table 4.1 (See Appendix). As it is shown in the table, the commercialization
probabilities decrease with higher σ and increase with higher T ∗. Intuitively, when
σ goes up, the option value of commercialization goes up. Decision maker tends to
defer commercialization until the option value is fully captured before paying the
sunk cost which leads to lower commercialization probabilities. When T ∗ increases,
there is a higher probability that the optimal commercialization threshold will be
exceeded in expectation, since the growth rate µ of the stochastic process is positive.
Thus a higher T ∗ leads to higher commercialization probability.
In conclusion, the project with commercialization flexibility has a higher prob-
ability to start the R&D process as well as commercialization earlier under low
uncertainties. Hence it is great for the government to offer commercialization
flexibility when uncertainty is low. However, when uncertainty is high, both the
probabilities of starting the R&D and commercialization processes are lower, which
implies less investment incentives and a longer time before the products are launched.
In this case, the government is better off by making immediate commercialization
compulsory. Moreover, faster approval policy, which is modeled by a less T ∗, works
better when σ is lower since the probability of commercialization is negative related
to the uncertainty in the revenue process.
4.6 Policy implications
Several policy implications can be drawn from the models.
First, if the priority of the government is to maximize the utility of the expen-
diture or the total value of the R& D project, commercialization flexibility should
always be provided. For the project without commercialization flexibility, at the
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approval date, the pharmaceutical company has no option but to commercialize
immediately. However, for the other project, the decision maker has the flexibility to
decide the timing of the commercialization process, which adds value to the whole
project. Thus the value of the project that has commercialization process always
dominates the other one, due to the additional option value of the flexibility. Hence
if the value of the project is the top concern, the authority should always allow the
pharmaceutical companies to decide when to start selling the drugs.
Second, if earlier investment is the priority, for different combination of the
uncertainty and the length of the investment lag, two opposite policies should be
provided.
On one hand, it is better not to provide with commercialization flexibility for
the projects with long investment lag when uncertainty is high. In practice, the
reason that a project has longer investment lag could be that the pharmaceutical
company is working on a product which is of great therapeutic improvement. For
the pharmaceutical company, once these products are launched, the profits are huge
since the drugs with great improvements often have the potential to become the
“blockbuster drug”. Uncertainty can be anything that has great influence on the
profitability of the drug. Since “blockbuster drugs” will usually take over the whole
market without competitors, when uncertainty is high, it is wise to delay selling the
drugs, which will maximize the commercialization process without being worried
about similar products launched. In this case, if the authority believes it is necessary
to incentivize these companies to launch selling the drugs earlier, commercialization
flexibility should not be provided. The earlier the products are commercialized, the
higher benefits the patients will get. The option value that is missing because of the
policy could be subsidized in ways such as lower tax or price subsidy as a reward
for both therapeutic improvement as well as earlier investment.
On the other hand, it is fine to provide pharmaceutical companies with commer-
cialization flexibility when uncertainty is low. The reason is that when uncertainty is
low, despite the length of the project, as uncertainty goes up, the NPV of the project
that has commercialization flexibility increases faster than the option value. In other
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words, the opportunity cost of waiting goes up as uncertainty goes up, which leads
to earlier investment. Ultimately, the profitability of immediate investment could be
one of the decisive factors regarding whether commercialization flexibility should
be allowed or not. In order to incentivize earlier investment, commercialization
flexibility should be provided when the opportunity cost of waiting is higher.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, this thesis models a pharmaceutical R&D project under uncertainty
where investment decisions are influenced by both investment lag and commer-
cialization flexibility. It is assumed that the end of the R&D process does not
necessarily generate the revenues, which is different from many other real options
models assuming that the payoffs will be received immediately after the investment
lag. Because of the commercialization flexibility, the decision maker is able to
choose whether to start commercialization immediately or delay it, dependent on
the value of the stochastic process at that time. In this project, the option to start
investment is the prerequisite of the option to defer commercialization. Hence the
project can also be considered as a compound option with an investment lag, which
is new in the literature of evaluation on pharmaceutical R&D projects.
By comparing the two projects, we find that the project with commercialization
flexibility provides with more investment incentives when uncertainty is low despite
the fact that it always has a higher project value. When uncertainty is low, the option
value of commercialization flexibility is low, since the NPV of the project is higher,
the investment threshold is lower and the investment probability is higher. When
uncertainty is high, the total option value of the project is higher which leads to a
higher investment threshold and lower investment probability.
Finally, this thesis discusses the probability of immediate commercialization by
the end of the R&D process. For the project without commercialization flexibility,
the probability is 1. For the other project, uncertainty will reduce the probability of
immediate commercialization since decision maker will want to capture the option
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value by waiting further. On the other hand, a higher investment lag will increase
the probability of commercialization. Hence, fast approval policy, modeled by a
smaller investment lag, is more effective in terms of early commercialization when
uncertainty is low.
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4.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1
(a) Since Yt+T ∗ follows Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), Yt+T ∗ =Yte(µ−
1
2σ
2)T ∗+σBT∗ ,
where BT ∗ ∼ N(0,T ∗).
Thus the expected value
EYt (Yt+T ∗) =Yte
(µ− 12σ2)T ∗Et(eσBT∗ )
=Yte(µ−
1
2σ
2)T ∗
∫ ∞
−∞
eσBT∗
1√
2πT ∗
e−
B2T∗
2T∗ dBT ∗
=Yte(µ−
1
2σ
2)T ∗
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2πT ∗
e
−(BT∗−T∗σ)2+(T∗)2σ2
2T∗ dBT ∗
=Yte(µ−
1
2σ
2)T ∗e
σ2T∗
2
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2πT ∗
e
−(BT∗−T∗σ)2
2T∗ dBT ∗
=Yte(µ−
1
2σ
2)T ∗e
σ2T∗
2
=YteµT
∗
. (4.28)
(b) Let f (Yt+T ∗) = (Yt+T ∗)β1 , by using Ito’s lemma we have
d(Yt+T ∗)β1 = (µ2Y
∂ f
∂Y
+
1
2
σ2Y 2
∂ 2 f
∂Y 2
)dt+σY
∂ f
∂Y
dBt
=
[
µβ1+
1
2
σ2β1(β1−1)
]
Y β1dt+σβ1Y β1dBt . (4.29)
Divide equation 4.29 by f (Yt+T ∗) on both sides, then we have
d f (Yt+T ∗)
f (Yt+T ∗)
= µ˜dt+ σ˜dBt , (4.30)
where the parameters µ˜ = µβ1+ 12σ
2β1(β1−1) and σ˜ = σβ1. So, it is proved that
(Yt+T ∗)β1 also follows GBM with a drift µ˜ and a volatility σ˜ if Yt+T ∗ follows GBM.
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By using the result proved in part (a), we know that
EYt
[
(Yt+T ∗)β1
]
= (Yt)β1e[µβ1+
1
2σ
2β1(β1−1)]T ∗ . (4.31)
In conclusion,
EYt (C(Yt+T ∗ ;Y
∗)|Yt+T ∗ < Y ∗) = EYt
[
(Yt+T ∗)β1
]
(Y ∗)−β1(
Y ∗
ρ−µ − Ic)
= (Yt)β1e[µβ1+
1
2σ
2β1(β1−1)]T ∗(Y ∗)−β1(
Y ∗
ρ−µ − Ic)
(4.32)
and
EYt (D(Yt+T ∗)|Yt+T ∗ ≥ Y ∗) =
EYt
(
Yt+T ∗
)
ρ−µ − Ic =
YteµT
∗
ρ−µ − Ic. (4.33)
Since Yt+T ∗ follows GBM,
Yt+T ∗ = Yte(µ−
1
2σ
2)T ∗+σBT∗ , (4.34)
log(Yt+T∗Yt ) is normally distributed with expectation (µ− 12σ2)T ∗ and variance σ2T ∗,
i.e.,
log(
Yt+T ∗
Yt
)∼ N((µ− 1
2
σ2)T ∗,σ2T ∗). (4.35)
By standardization,
log(Yt+T∗Yt )− (µ− 12σ2)T ∗
σ
√
T ∗
∼ N(0,1) (4.36)
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and
PYt (Yt+T ∗ < Y
∗) = PYt (
log(Yt+T∗Yt )− (µ− 12σ2)T ∗
σ
√
T ∗
<
log(Y
∗
Yt
)− (µ− 12σ2)T ∗
σ
√
T ∗
),
(4.37)
which completes the proof. 
Conjecture 4.1
We first try to prove the existence of at least one solution to the equation (4.26).
Since the general solution of F∗R (y) is Ayβ1 , to prove that there is a unique y such
that F∗R (y) f ′R(y) = (F∗R (y))′ fR(y) holds, we first replace F∗R (y) with Ayβ1 . Thus we
have
Ayβ1 f ′R(y) = Aβ1y
β1−1 fR(y) (4.38)
=⇒ y f ′R(y) = β1 fR(y) (4.39)
=⇒ y = β1 fR(y)f ′R(y)
:= f (y) (4.40)
If f (y) is an increasing function, according to the Knaster-Tarski fixed-point
theorem, there exists at least one y that satisfies y = f (y). Thus the problem is
reduced to prove that f (y)′ > 0.
Since
f (y)′ =
β1
[
( f ′R(y))2− f (y) f ′′R (y)
]
( f ′R(y))2
, (4.41)
β1 > 1 and f ′(y)2 > 0, we need to prove
f ′R(y)
2− fR(y) f ′′R (y)> 0. (4.42)
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However, the function fR (see Equation 4.25) is highly non-linear since it is
composed the products of convex functions with cumulative distribution functions
(CDF). Hence the derivative f ′R will be even more complicated and it is composed of
the products of convex functions, CDF and probability density function (PDF). It is
difficult to prove the inequality f ′R(y)2− fR(y) f ′′R (y)> 0 holds analytically. However,
extensive numerical experiments show that the inequality f ′R(y)2− fR(y) f ′′R (y) >
0 always holds under different parameter values. As Figure 4.3 shows that the
minimum value of f ′(y) is positive and it stays as a constant when y is large enough.
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(a) y ranges from [0.001,2] (b) y ranges from [0.001, 0.2]
Fig. 4.3 Numerical experiments of f ′(y). The parameter values are: the discount rate
ρ = 0.05, the growth rate µ = 0.03, the sunk cost for commercialization Ic = 1, the
cost flows per period during the R&D process cR = 0.05, the uncertainties σ = 0.2
and the investment lag T ∗ = 10.
Next, we try to prove the uniqueness of the solution. Because the NPV function
fR is the weighted average of two convex functions, which are EYt
(
C(Yt+T ∗;Y ∗c )|Yt+T ∗ <
Y ∗c
)
and EYt
(
D(Yt+T ∗c )|Yt+T ∗ ≥ Y ∗c
)
, and the option value function is simply the ex-
pected discounted NPV when the investment optimally takes place. Moreover, since
the expected discount factor often takes the form of f (y)β1 which is also a convex
function. Thus we argue that the value function should be a more convex func-
tion than the NPV function where the second order condition is satisfied (Thijssen
(2013a)).
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Thus we conclude that f ′(y)> 0 and there is a unique Yˆ such that F∗R (y) f ′R(y) =
(F∗R (y))′ fR(y) holds. 
Commercialization Probabilities under Different Un-
certainty σ and Investment Lag T ∗.
Table 4.1 Simulation of the immediate commercialization probabilities. The uncer-
tainty σ changes from 0.1 to 0.9, the growth rate of the stochastic process µ = 0.03,
the investment lag T ∗ = 5 and 10 years, the cost of commercialization Ic = 0.8, the
R&D cost flow of each period cR = 0.05.
σ T ∗ = 5 T ∗ = 10
0.1 1 1
0.2 0.9985 1
0.3 0.9348 0.9991
0.4 0.8115 0.9777
0.5 0.7134 0.9283
0.6 0.6483 0.8772
0.7 0.6092 0.8356
0.8 0.5866 0.8116
0.9 0.5740 0.7966
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Chapter 5
On the Interaction of Government
Quality Standards and
Pharmaceutical Investment Timing
5.1 Abstract
This chapter discusses how different roles that the government plays in the pharma-
ceutical R&D projects will help solve the lack of investment problem on Neglected
Tropical Diseases (NTDs). There are two types of projects that the government acts
within: as a sponsor in the Private-Public Partnership (PPP) with another pharma-
ceutical company (the decentralized project), or acts as the social planner being
in charge of the whole project. It is proved that the optimal investment threshold
of the social planner’s project is lower and the project value strictly dominates the
decentralized project. However, the model also shows that the remuneration level is
a great tool to adjust the quality standard of the product in the decentralized project
but not in the social planner’s project. Policy advices that the social planner’s project
is a better option if funding is limited since the project starts sooner and leads to
higher quality product. The decentralized project is a better choice if funding is
71
5.2. INTRODUCTION
sufficient and a higher quality standard is the priority.
5.2 Introduction
Seventeen kinds of NTDs, classified by the World Health Organization (WHO),
cause severe pain, long-term disability, and are the cause of death for over 500,000
people per year.1 It is estimated that more than 1 billion people suffer from at
least one NTD (WHO (2015)). Most often, the people affected by these tropical
diseases are living in the poorest developing countries, which are suffering from
poor sanitation, lack of clean water, and necessary health care. The diseases, which
cause high mortality and morbidity among the people, are traditionally neglected in
the pharmaceutical industry for mainly two reasons. First, people affected by these
tropical diseases have a low profile and status in public health priorities, and lack a
strong political voice.2 Second, the pharmaceutical industry has little incentive to
invest in R&D for the diseases that predominantly plague poor nations, as medicines
cannot be sold there at a price that would allow pharmaceutical firms to cover
their high R&D costs (Buckup (2008)). It is found that, of 1393 new chemical
entities marketed between 1975 and 1999, only 16 were for tropical diseases and
tuberculosis. There is a 13-fold greater chance of a drug being brought to market for
central-nervous-system disorders or cancer than for a neglected disease (Trouiller
et al. (2002)).
In order to tackle the lack of investment incentives problem, governments, non-
profit organizations (NPOs) and foundations have been contributing substantial funds
to help increase the investments on the R&D projects that deal with NTDs. Various
favorable marketing conditions, including research grants, public support for clinical
trials (Yamey (2002)), are granted to encourage pharmaceutical companies to enter
into public-private partnership (PPP). With the support of the public organizations,
1The END (Ending Neglected Diseases) fund. http://www.end.org/whatwedo/ntdoverview
2World Health Organization (WHO) Q&A, Why are some tropical diseases called “neglect”?
http://www.who.int/features/qa/58/en/
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investment intentions of the pharmaceutical companies in the R&D projects that deal
with NTDs may increase. Since pharmaceutical investment is subject to substantial
uncertainty on future market conditions, one of the proposed mechanisms to deal
with this uncertainty in the public-private partnership is via Advance Purchase
Commitments (APC).
These are commitments, by the public organizations such as the governments or
NPOs, “to purchase specified ‘technologies’ in specified ‘quantities’ in the ‘future’
at a ‘guaranteed’ unit ‘price’ ” (Farlow (2004) [quotation mark in the original]).
Despite the many disadvantages of this mechanism as discussed by Farlow (2004),
it is widely accepted that APCs are one of the best ways to finance R&D projects
for neglected diseases (Levine et al. (2005)).
Another way of solving the lack of investment problem is that the government
will be responsible for the drug development on its own instead of cooperating
with privates firms. Giesecke (2000) compared the science and technology (S&T)
policies of Germany and the US and showed that direct interventionist S&T policy
did not necessarily lead to successful innovations. Despite the effort that the German
government has made, such as initiating working groups, advisory boards, and fund-
ing programs for the advancement of biotech research, it turned out that “enabling a
preferable economic ecology for biotech development was more successful than an
interventionist policy.”
However, this does not help much if the priority now is not to develop a self-
growing market for battling NTDs in a long run, but to have sufficient projects which
are able to produce high quality drugs to cure the affected people in the short run
since most of the NTDs can be “eliminated”. For instance, Malaria is not coming
back to the developed countries where it has been effectively wiped out. The priority
is to choose a project that starts as soon as possible, produces high quality drugs
and has higher project value with same costs.
In this chapter, which role the government should play in the drug development
is discussed by comparing two projects with different managerial structures. In
the first project, an advance purchase commitments contract is signed between the
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government and a biopharmaceutical company. The contract states that once the
drug produced by the biopharmaceutical company meets a quality standard set by
the government, a fixed amount of money will be paid to the company. In the second
project, the government plays the role of a social planner and is responsible for
the research, production and marketing of the drug on its own. More often than
not, the drug development projects have the following features. First, the costs
are irreversible; second, the investment timing is flexible; last, the cash flows are
uncertain. The real options approach is a good choice in evaluating these projects
since it captures all these features.
The analysis in the comparison of the two projects is similar to the vertical
control problem in the industrial organization literature, regarding the relationship
of an “upstream firm” and a “downstream firm” (Tirole (1988)). In the decentralized
project, the government is similar to the role of the downstream firm since it
purchases the products from the pharmaceutical company, and then sells them to the
consumers. In the IO literature, however, the upstream firm usually moves first by
selling the intermediate products to the downstream firms, and then to the retailers
(downstream firm). Then after transformation of the intermediate products, the
retailers sell the final products to consumers.
In terms of welfare analysis, we show that the integrated project or the social
planner’s project has a higher overall project value, which is similar to the result
of Spengler (1950). He argues that the vertical structure is more profitable under
vertical integration than under a linear price since the monopoly profit of the vertical
structure is realized. The social welfare is increased due to the elimination of the
“double marginalization” problem. However, in this model, the effects of the prices
and demands of the intermediate and final product are not considered, the different
projects’ values are only dependent on the quality of the product. The reason for a
higher value for the integrated project is because the maximization problems that
the government and the pharmaceutical company solve are constrained, while the
problem the social planner solves is unconstrained.
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There are four main findings of this chapter. First, it shows that the optimal
investment threshold of the social planner’s project is strictly lower than the decen-
tralized project. In other words, the social planner’s project will always start sooner.
Second, if the budget for remuneration is limited while the sunk cost of the project
is relatively low, a social planner’s project is a better option since the project not
only starts sooner but also ends up with higher quality standard. Third, if there is
sufficient funding to afford higher remuneration, the remuneration level can be used
as an effective tool to adjust the quality standard of the product. However, increasing
the remuneration level could also lead to a delay in commercialization. Last, the
social planner’s project has a higher project value than the decentralized one and
this fact is independent of the key parameters of the model, such as discount rate,
growth rate and uncertainty.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follow. Section 5.3 introduces
decentralized project. Section 5.4 discusses the project run by the social planner.
In section 5.5, the values of the two projects are compared. Section 5.6 considers
policy implications. Finally, section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
5.3 The Decentralized R&D Project
Consider a pharmaceutical company that is provided with an opportunity to invest
in developing a drug. The investment is irreversible and subject to a sunk cost I > 0
which is paid at the start of the project. To ensure the future market and incentivize
the company to invest, an advance purchase commitments contract is signed between
the government and the company specifying: (1) The quality standard of the drug,
which is often set by the industry and sponsors together and (2) The revenues of
the project, which will be paid as a constant cash flow R per period infinitely, if the
quality standard is met. In practice, the cash flows will only be paid for a certain
period of time. However, with a finite horizon, the expected discounted value of the
cash flows simply equals to the value of infinite cash flows multiply by a discount
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factor, which can be easily applied. For analytical convenience, we assume the cash
flows are infinite here.
When the project is finished, there would be an independent adjudication com-
mittee (IAC), with primary responsibility for determining whether the product meets
the technical specification (Berndt and Hurvitz (2005)). The pre-specified quality
standard is denoted by qAc in the model. Like many other R&D projects, there exist
investment lags. In other words, the sunk cost will be paid long before receiving
revenues in the future since it takes time to reach the quality standard.
Every pharmaceutical project can be considered as a series of sub-projects
and is composed of several nodes including pre-discovery, discovery, pre-clinical,
phase I, II and III and approval (Hartmann and Hassan (2006)). In order to focus
on the problems that we are interested in the chapter, we simplify the project by
combining the phases mentioned above into two major phases: the research phase
before incurring a great amount of costs, which includes pre-discovery, discovery,
pre-clinical phases and the development phase after paying the sunk cost, which
includes the three phases of clinical trials (Paul et al. (2010)).
The uncertainty in revenues is dependent on the quality of the product which
is modeled by a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) (qt)t≥0. The quality of the
product mentioned in this chapter is an abstract indicator of the most probable
reasons of failures of the R&D process, such as lack of efficacy and safety issues
confirmed by Arrowsmith and Miller (2013) and Cook et al. (2014). As the R&D
process continues, more information will be collected as how to improve both
efficacy and safety of the products, which will update the previous knowledge
about the quality of the product as a whole. GBM is a great tool to model such a
situation where the trend of the quality is positive subject to fluctuations as more
information gathered during the drug development process. In the research phase,
the manufacturer will conduct researches including “Target-to-hit”, “Hit-to-lead”,
“Lead-to-optimization” and “pre-clinical trials” with lower costs in order to collect
as much information favorable to the development phase later. According to Paul
et al. (2010), the total cost of the development phase greatly out weights that of the
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research phase. Without loss of generality, we assume the cost of the research phase
is 0. However, the quality of the product will only be slightly improved during this
phase, which evolves according to the SDE,
dqt = µ1qtdt+σqtdBt , (5.1)
where Bt is a Wiener process and qt has initial value q, P−a.s.
Once the manufacturer considers the product promising, the development phase
starts and the sunk cost I will be paid, which will boost up the quality of the product
in a greater speed and the process is denoted by,
dqt = µ2qtdt+σqtdBt , (5.2)
where 0 < µ1 < µ2.
In conclusion, let τ be the time of investment. Then
dqt =

µ1qtdt+σqtdBt i f t < τ
µ2qtdt+σqtdBt i f t ≥ τ.
(5.3)
Although the pharmaceutical companies usually do not have priors for the
average qualities in both the research and development phases (µ1 and µ2), the idea
of setting µ1 < µ2 is to model a more intensive development stage, in which the
product has greater probability of success so that the quality increases faster after
paying the sunk cost. This assumption is more realistic for phase 1 and 3 trials in
that if the product has ever reached these stages, the transitional probabilities are
54% and 70% (Paul et al. (2010)). For phase 2 trial, the probability is estimated to
be 34%. Moreover, it is assumed that both trends are non-negative in that, to focus
on the choice of organizational structures and simplify the investment problems, the
projects are assumed to be successful with probability 1 if they last long enough.
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Consider the following dynamic game with two players: the government and
a pharmaceutical company. The government moves first by specifying a quality
standard qAc . Once q
A
c is reached, a constant cash flow R will be paid to the pharma-
ceutical company forever. The pharmaceutical company moves next by choosing
the optimal time τ to start the project and pay the sunk cost. The firm stops further
development of the product once qAc is reached.
It is worth noting that the cash flow R can also be modeled as qAc multiply by
some price p which will lead to the same conclusions in the chapter, since instead
of setting the cash flow per period equal to a constant R, the government can always
find a constant p that makes the product of p and qAc equal to R. For analytical
convenience, we use R.
5.3.1 The Pharmaceutical Company’s Problem
The time line of the project is as follows:
Discovery, µ1
0
Now
τ(qIc)
Cost incurred.
R&D starts
τ(qAc )
New drug approved.
Commercialization starts
R&D process, µ2
Once qAc is reached, the government will need to fulfill the advance purchase
commitments by paying a constant cash flow R to the pharmaceutical company. The
production cost that incurred by the company is denoted by C, a fixed cost flow per
period for infinity and it is assumed that R >C. In addition, the decision makers are
assumed to be risk neutral and that ρ is the discount rate of firm and government.
The NPV of commercialization when qAc being reached is:
f (qAc ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(R−C)dt
=
R−C
ρ
. (5.4)
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The stopping time of which the investment of the development phase becomes
optimal is denoted by τ . As in most of the real options literature, the optimal stopping
time takes the form of the first hitting times of some threshold qIc. For q
∗ > 0, denote
the first passage time of q∗ by τ(q∗) := inf{t ≥ 0 | qt ≥ q∗}. Thus the optimal time
of investment is τ(qIc). In addition, denote τs(q∗) := inf{t ≥ s | qt ≥ q∗} and the
subscript is omitted when s = 0. So, ττ(qIc)(q
A
c ) is the random time, starting from the
time of investment, that the quality standard is met. Thus τ(qAc ) = τ(qIc)+ττ(qIc)(q
A
c )
and revenues will accrue from this point onwards.
The firm’s problem is to solve the optimal stopping problem:
V S(q) = sup
τ(qIc)
Eq
[∫ ∞
τ(qIc)+ττ(qIc)(q
A
c )
e−ρt(R−C)dt− e−ρτ(qIc)I
]
= sup
qIc
Eq
{
e−ρτ(q
I
c)EqIc
[∫ ∞
ττ(qIc)(q
A
c )
e−ρt(R−C)dt− I
]}
= sup
qIc
Eq
{
e−ρτ(q
I
c)EqIc
[
e−ρττ(qIc)(q
A
c )EqAc
(∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(R−C)dt
)
− I
]}
≡ sup
qIc
Eq
[
e−ρτ(q
I
c)F(qIc)
]
, (5.5)
where
F(qIc) = EqIc
[
e−ρττ(qIc)(q
A
c )EqAc
(
f (qAc )
)]
− I
= EqIc
[
e−ρττ(qIc)(q
A
c ) f (qAc )
]
− I. (5.6)
The first line of equation 5.5 shows that the pharmaceutical company wants to
maximize the expected revenues accruing from time τ(qAc ) by paying the sunk cost I
at time τ(qIc). And ττ(qIc)(q
A
c ) is the first time that qt hits q
A
c after starting the project.
The equations that follow are further derivations by using the Markovian property
of the stochastic process (qt)t≥0. The last line is to formalize the problem into the
one that can be solved by the standard real options approach.
79
5.3. THE DECENTRALIZED R&D PROJECT
We first need to compute the value of F(qIc). Since f (q
A
c ) is a constant, it can be
taken out of the expectation and we obtain
F(qIc) = EqIc [e
−ρττ(qIc)(q
A
c )] f (qAc )− I. (5.7)
The characteristic operator of the process qt after investment is
Lqϕ =
1
2
σ2q2
∂ 2ϕ
∂q2
+µ2q
∂ϕ
∂q
. (5.8)
The general solution of the equationLqϕ = ρϕ is of the form,
ϕ(q) = Aqβ1(µ2)+Bqβ2(µ2), (5.9)
where β1(µ2)> 1 and β2(µ2)< 0 are the two roots of the quadratic equation,
Q2(β ) =
1
2
σ2β (β −1)+µ2β −ρ = 0. (5.10)
The boundary condition ϕ(0) = 0 can only be satisfied iff B = 0 which gives
ϕ(q) = Aqβ1(µ2) on (qIc,qAc ). For now, we assume that qIc < qAc .
By using Dynkin’s formula, the expected discount factor is
EqIc[e
−ρττ(qIc)(q
A
c )] =
ϕ(qIc)
ϕ(qAc )
=
(
qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)
. (5.11)
So the value of F(qIc) is
F(qIc) =
(
qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)
f (qAc )− I
=
(
qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)(R−C
ρ
)
− I. (5.12)
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By using the same approach above again, we are able to compute the expected
discount factor,
Eq
[
e−ρτ(q
I
c)
]
=
(
q
qIc
)β1(µ1)
, (5.13)
where β1(µ1)> 1 is one of the two roots of the quadratic equation,
Q1(β ) =
1
2
σ2β (β −1)+µ1β −ρ = 0. (5.14)
Proposition 5.1 The project value for the pharmaceutical company is:
V S(q) =

(
q
qIc
)β1(µ1)[( qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)(R−C
ρ
)
− I
]
i f q < qIc(
q
qAc
)β1(µ2)(R−C
ρ
)
− I i f qIc ≤ q < qAc
R−C
ρ i f q≥ qAc
(5.15)
From the perspective of the pharmaceutical company, the value of the project
at any point in time is dependent on the value of the stochastic process (qt)t≥0,
which represents the quality of the product at that time. If the product’s quality
is less than the optimal investment threshold qIc, the best strategy is to stay in the
discovery phase, wait and observe the evolution of (qt)t≥0, and pay the sunk cost as
soon as qIc is reached. If the product’s quality is larger or equal to q
I
c, but less than
the pre-specified quality qAc , the best strategy is to invest and start the development
phase immediately. Finally, if the quality is larger or equal to qIc, there is no point in
staying in the research phase or starting the development phase, the best strategy of
the pharmaceutical company is to start commercialization process immediately by
paying the operating cost C per period.
Proposition 5.2 qIc is the optimal investment threshold that maximizes the pharma-
ceutical company’s project value and qIc = q
A
c
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
]1/β1(µ2)
.
See proof of the proposition in the Appendix.
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Lemma 5.1 The ratio β1(µ1)β1(µ1)−β1(µ2) > 1, which ensures that the investment threshold
qIc is non-negative.
See proof of lemma 5.1 in the Appendix.
In addition, to ensure proposition 5.2 makes economic sense, it is assumed that
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2) <
R−C
ρI , therefore, q
I
c < q
A
c . This condition will need to be satisfied so
that the pharmaceutical company will have incentive to start the project in the first
place. Otherwise, conducting basic research in the discovery phase without paying
any costs will lead to a successful product.
5.3.2 The Government’s Problem
In the previous section, we have computed the optimal investment threshold of
the pharmaceutical company which is shown in proposition 5.2. For each quality
standard set by the government, the pharmaceutical company will come up with
a unique corresponding optimal investment threshold. Since there is no hidden
information between the two players, the government knows that the quality standard
will be set under the condition that the equation qIc = q
A
c
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
]1/β1(µ2)
is a common knowledge. Moreover, since the government is the first mover in the
game, the pharmaceutical company will have to accept the quality standard given
and adjusts its strategies accordingly. Mathematically, qIc is a function of q
A
c and it
will be replaced by using qAc in the calculation of the government’s optimal quality
standard.
The objective of the government is to set an optimal quality standard qAc to
maximize the present value of patients’ health gain net of payment to the firm.
Suppose the patients’ overall health is linearly dependent on the quality of the
product, which is represented by B(qAc ) = Kq
A
c , where K > 0. The problem of the
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government is then:
V F(q) = sup
qAc
Eq
[∫ ∞
τ(qIc)+ττ(qIc)(q
A
c )
e−ρt(KqAc −R)dt
]
= sup
qAc
Eq
{
e−ρτ(q
I
c)EqIc
[∫ ∞
ττ(qIc)(q
A
c )
e−ρt(KqAc −R)dt
]}
= sup
qAc
Eq
{
e−ρτ(q
I
c)EqIc
[
e−ρττ(qIc)(q
A
c )EqAc
(∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(KqAc −R)dt
)]}
= sup
qAc
{(
q
qIc
)β1(µ1)
EqIc
[
e−ρττ(qIc)(q
A
c )v(qAc )
]}
, (5.16)
where
v(qAc ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(KqAc −R)dt
=
KqAc −R
ρ
. (5.17)
In the above equations, the Markovian property of the stochastic process (qt)t≥0
is used again by treating the time to start the project τ(qIc) and the approval time
τ(qAc ) as new beginnings.
By using the same approach in the last section, we are able to compute the
expected discount factor,
EqIc
[
e−ρττ(qIc)(q
A
c )
]
=
(
qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)
. (5.18)
As in the problem of the pharmaceutical company, the government’s problem
can be rewritten as:
V F(q) = sup
qAc
{(
q
qIc
)β1(µ1)
EqIc
[
e−ρττ(qIc)(q
A
c )
]
v(qAc )
}
= sup
qAc
{(
q
qIc
)β1(µ1)( qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)
v(qAc )
}
. (5.19)
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Proposition 5.3 The project value for the government is
V F(q) =

(
q
qIc
)β1(µ1)[( qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)(KqAc−R
ρ
)]
i f q < qIc(
q
qAc
)β1(µ2)(KqAc−R
ρ
)
i f qIc ≤ q < qAc
Kq−R
ρ i f q≥ qAc
(5.20)
The value of the government’s project is dependent on the current quality of
the product. If the current quality q < qIc, the pharmaceutical company will stay
in the discovery phase and wait until the optimal investment threshold is reached
before investment. After investment, the development phase continues till the
optimal quality standard is met which is the time the payoff of the government is
realized. If the current quality qIc ≤ q < qAc , the pharmaceutical company will start
the development phase immediately and the payoff is realized when the optimal
quality standard is met. Lastly, if q≥ qAc , the quality of the product has exceeded
the optimal quality standard. Hence the government can launch selling the product
immediately.
Proposition 5.4 qAc is the optimal quality standard that maximizes the government’s
project value and qAc =
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−1
R
K . Replacing q
A
c in the value of q
I
c in proposition
5.2, we have
qIc =
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−1
R
K
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
]1/β1(µ2)
. (5.21)
See proof of proposition 5.4 in the Appendix.
Since the government’s willingness to pay is a constant, the only decision that
the pharmaceutical company will have to make is when to start investment regardless
of the timing of commercialization. In this case, when the quality standard qAc is
reached, the products are commercialized immediately. And for the government,
the only decision to make is how a quality standard qAc is supposed to be set which
maximizes patients’ health gains net of payoffs to the firm, conditional on the
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reaction function of the pharmaceutical company being a common knowledge to
both players. The unique pair of strategies that maximize the project values of
both players is (qAc ,q
I
c) . The uniqueness is due to both the optimal thresholds are
satisfying value matching and smooth pasting conditions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
5.4 The Social Planner’s R&D Project
In the decentralized R&D project, the pharmaceutical company and the government
are both involved and each of them is in charge of only part of the project. The
government is charge of the commercialization process and it moves first by setting
a quality standard of the final product. The pharmaceutical company is in charge of
the research and development of the product. Dependent on the quality standard, it
moves next by choosing the best time to start the development phase. The goal of
each player is to maximize the project value that each of them being in charge of .
Now consider the project is taken over by a social planner who will be in charge
of both R&D and commercialization. In this case, the decision of investment and
how to set the optimal quality standard will need to be considered simultaneously.
The goal of the social planner is to maximize the project value as a whole.
The optimal investment threshold and the optimal quality standard are denoted
by qII and q
A
I , respectively, in the social planner’s project. The problem of the social
planner is:
V I(q) = sup
qAI ,q
I
I
Eq
[∫ ∞
τ(qAI )
e−ρt(B(qAI )−C)dt− Ie−ρτ(q
I
I)
]
= sup
qAI ,q
I
I
{(
q
qII
)β1(µ1)[( qII
qAI
)β1(µ2)(KqAI −C
ρ
)
− I
]}
(5.22)
The investment problem can be solved by treating qAI as a constant and taking
the partial derivatives of V I(q) with respect to qII .
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And ∂V
I(q)
∂qII
= 0 gives
qII = q
A
I
(
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
KqAI −C
)1/β1(µ2)
. (5.23)
The problem of what quality standard to be set in order to maximize the social
welfare can be solved by taking partial derivatives of V I(q) with respect to qAc .
And ∂V
I(q)
∂qAc
= 0 gives
qAI =
β1(µ2)
β1(µ2)−1
C
K
. (5.24)
Replacing qAI in equation 5.23, we have
qII =
β1(µ2)
β1(µ2)−1
C
K
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)−1)
ρI
C
]1/β1(µ2)
. (5.25)
In addition, to ensure equation 5.23 makes economic sense, it is assumed that
qII ≤ qAI . Thus, the condition
C >
β1(µ1)(β1(µ2)−1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2) ρI (5.26)
must be satisfied.
Proposition 5.5 The value of project run by the social planner V I(q) is maximized
if the development phase starts at qII and the quality standard is set to be q
A
I .
See proof of proposition 5.5 in the Appendix.
Proposition 5.6 The project value of the social planner is
V I(q) =

(
q
qII
)β1(µ1)[( qII
qAI
)β1(µ2)(KqAI −C
ρ
)]
i f q < qII(
q
qAI
)β1(µ2)(KqAI −C
ρ
)
i f qII ≤ q < qAI
Kq−C
ρ i f q≥ qAI
(5.27)
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The project value of the social planner is dependent on the quality of the product.
If the current quality is less than the optimal investment threshold i.e., q < qII , the
social planner will consider stay in the discovery phase, wait and collect more
information and invest until the quality is high enough. If the current quality is
higher than the optimal investment threshold but lower than the optimal quality
standard i.e., qII ≤ q < qAI , the social planner will skip the discovery phase and start
the development phase immediately. The development phase will be finished until
the optimal quality standard is first met. Lastly, if the current quality is larger than
the optimal quality standard i.e., q≥ qAI , both the research and development phase
can be skipped. The best strategy is to start commercialization right away.
5.5 Analysis of Thresholds and Project Values
All together, this thesis has introduced four different thresholds for the two projects.
They are: (1) qIc, the optimal investment threshold of the decentralized project, (2)
qAc , the optimal quality standard set by the government in the decentralized project,
(3) qII , the optimal investment threshold of the project run by the social planner and
(4) qAI , the optimal quality standard set by the social planner.
In order to make the investment problems more interesting, in both projects,
we assume that the optimal investment thresholds are less than the optimal quality
standards. Otherwise, the quality standard will be reached within the research phase
without starting the development phase which is usually unrealistic in reality.
More specifically, in the decentralized project, we assume that qIc < q
A
c . The
corresponding condition to be satisfied is
R >
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)ρI+C. (5.28)
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In the project run by the social planner, we assume that qII < q
A
I . The correspond-
ing condition to be satisfied is
C >
β1(µ1)(β1(µ2)−1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2) ρI. (5.29)
Next, we discuss the relation of the two optimal investment thresholds.
Proposition 5.7 The investment threshold of the social planner’s project qII , is
strictly less than that of the decentralized project qIc, i.e., q
I
I < q
I
c.
See proof of Proposition 5.7 in the Appendix.
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Fig. 5.1 The difference of investment
thresholds as uncertainty varies.
To show the difference of the two
investment thresholds in a more intu-
itive way, we present a numerical ex-
ample when the parameter values are
µ1 = 0.02, µ2 = 0.2, σ = [0.001,0.9],
I = 10, ρ = 0.5, C = 20, K = 100 and
R = 80. Figure 5.1 shows the invest-
ment threshold of the project is strictly
dominated when run by the social plan-
ner. Given that the growth rates µ1, µ2
and the volatility σ of the stochastic
process (qt)t≥0 are the same for both
projects, smaller investment threshold means sooner investment and start of the
development phase.
Intuitively, the difference of the investment threshold lies in the different orga-
nizational structure of the two projects. In the decentralized project, there are two
players whose goals are to maximize their own project values. From the perspective
of the government, for a certain quality standard, the sooner the investment takes
place, the higher the payoffs; and an earlier investment means the product will be
finished sooner due to higher growth rate and there will be less discounting on the
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value of patients’ wealth gain. However, from the perspective of the pharmaceutical
company, earlier investment means giving up the information and the chance to
improve of the quality of product during the discovery phase. In order to capture the
option value in the discovery phase, the pharmaceutical company will tend to wait
and invest when the quality of the product is high enough.
However, for the project run by the social planner, the objective of the social
planner is to maximize the project value as a whole. Both investment timing and
quality standard are considered simultaneously. For the same quality standard, earlier
investment helps sooner realization of patients’ health gain, which is consistent with
the benefit of the social planner. Although earlier investment benefits the government
in the decentralized project, it does not necessarily benefit the pharmaceutical
company. The conflict between the two players in the decentralized project leads to
late investment. Hence the investment threshold in the social planner’s project is
lower without conflicts.
A noticeable difference between the two projects is that the pharmaceutical
company will receive a renumeration R from the government by the end of the
development phase in the decentralized project if the product is successful. However,
in the project run by the social planner, the variable R does not exist.
Next, the effects that the renumeration level has on the different thresholds in the
decentralized project and the relation of the optimal quality standards in different
projects because of R is analyzed.
For computational convenience, denote M as the right hand side of the inequality
5.28, i.e., M = β1(µ1)β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)ρI+C, and denote N =
(β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ2)C.
Proposition 5.8 When 0< I < (β1(µ1)−β1(µ2))
2C
β1(µ1)2(β1(µ2)−1)ρ , M <N. If M <R<N, the optimal
quality standard of the decentralized project is less than the one run by the social
planner i.e., qAc < q
A
I . Hence, q
I
I < q
I
c < q
A
c < q
A
I .
See proof of Proposition 5.8 in the Appendix.
The optimal quality standard of the social planner qAI is not affected by the
variations of remuneration level since there is no remuneration in the social planner’s
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project. However, a lower remuneration level will lead to a lower quality standard
in the decentralized project qAc (See Proposition 5.4). The sunk cost does not affect
the quality standards of both projects directly. In the social planner’s project, the
decrease in the sunk cost will lead to a lower required operating cost (see equation
5.29), which does not have any influence on the quality standard if the operating
cost is high enough. Similarly, the quality standard of the decentralized project qAc is
indirectly affected by the sunk cost. A lower sunk cost will lead to a lower required
remuneration (see Equation 5.28). However, as long as the minimum requirement
of R is satisfied, i.e., if equation 5.28 holds, the sunk cost I will not influence the
quality standard of the decentralized project. The proposition shows that when R is
low, the optimal quality standard of the decentralized project is less than the one run
by the social planner. Policy advices that if the budget for remuneration is limited
while the sunk cost of the project is relatively low, a social planner’s project is
preferred since the project will not only be started sooner, which means the products
will be finished and commercialized sooner, the quality standard of the project is
also higher.
Proposition 5.9 When 0< I < (β1(µ1)−β1(µ2))
2C
β1(µ1)2(β1(µ2)−1)ρ , M <N and when I≥
(β1(µ1)−β1(µ2))2C
β1(µ1)2(β1(µ2)−1)ρ ,
M ≥ N. If R≥max{M,N}, the optimal quality standard of the project run by the
social planner is less or equal to the one of the decentralized project, i.e., qAI ≤ qAc .
Moreover, there is a unique remuneration level Rc (Rcc) such that the optimal
investment threshold of the decentralized project equals the optimal quality stan-
dard of the social planner’s project, i.e., qIc = q
A
I . Thus if N(M) ≤ R < Rc(Rcc),
qII < q
I
c < q
A
I < q
A
c . If R≥ Rc(Rcc), qII < qAI ≤ qIc < qAc .
See proof of Proposition 5.9 in the Appendix.
By increasing the remuneration level, the result in Proposition 5.8 can be re-
versed. When R≥max{M,N}, the quality standard of the decentralized project qAc
increases while the quality standard of the social planner’s project qAI is not affected.
Moreover, as R goes up, the investment threshold of the decentralized project qIc
first goes down then goes up. When N(M)≤ R < Rc(Rcc), the investment threshold
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of the decentralized project is less than the quality standard of the social planner’s
project, i.e., qIc < q
A
I . If R further increases, when R ≥ Rc(Rcc), the investment
threshold of the decentralized project will be larger or equal to the quality standard
of the social planner’s project, i.e., qIc ≥ qAI .
With sufficient funding, the remuneration level R can be used as a tool to adjust
the quality standard of the product in the decentralized project, which is not possible
for the social planner’s project. However, this is with the cost that the product will be
commercialized later since qIc will be increasing with R as well. In an extreme case,
for instance, when R takes values in R≥ Rc(Rcc), it may be that the final product in
the social planner’s project has been finished while the development phase has not
even started in the decentralized project.
Moreover, it can be proved that Rcc ≤ Rc. In other words, the higher the sunk
cost I, the less remuneration R is required to make qIc approaches q
A
I from below.
Mathematically, this is because qIc increases with I while q
A
I is not affected if the
operating cost C reaches the minimum value, i.e., C > β1(µ1)(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)−β1(µ2) ρI.
Next, in Figure 5.2, we analyze how investment threshold of the decentralized
project vary with uncertainty and how the spread of the maximum and minimum
value of the threshold changes under different sunk costs and level of remunerations.
Proposition 5.10 The spread of the maximum and minimum value of the investment
threshold under different uncertainties decreases when the remuneration level R
increases. And the spread increases with increasing sunk cost I.
The investment threshold of the decentralized project increases with uncertainty.
Moreover, as the remuneration level R increases, the spread of the maximum and
minimum value of the investment threshold decreases. The effect of R on the
investment threshold qIc can be separated into two parts. From Proposition 5.4, we
know that qIc =
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−1
R
K
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
]1/β1(µ2)
which can be considered as a
product of two terms. First, an increase in R will lead to higher quality standard
since qAc =
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−1
R
K . This is quite intuitive since a product with higher quality
often requires more input of the available resources such as time, money and
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effort. To increase the incentives of consuming more resources on the research and
development of a product, a higher remuneration level will be needed. The influence
that the remuneration level R has on the optimal quality standard qAc is the “quality
effect” and this effect will tend to delay the investment decision. Second, an increase
in R means higher future revenues and thus, decision maker will want to receive
the revenues sooner. We call the influence that R has on the NPV of the project
the “NPV effect” which encourages earlier investment and is captured in the term[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
]1/β1(µ2)
.
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Fig. 5.2 The investment threshold of the decentralized project changes with un-
certainty and the spread of the maximum and minimum value of the investment
threshold under different sunk costs I and remuneration level R. The parameter
values are: µ1 = 0.02, µ2 = 0.2, σ = [0.001,0.9], I = 0.5 or 1, ρ = 0.5, C = 5,
K = 10 and R=10, 30 or 60. In the figures above, D represents the difference of the
maximum and minimum value of the investment threshold.
Figure 5.2 shows that when uncertainty is low, the investment threshold goes
up faster when R increases. Intuitively, as R goes up, the quality standard goes up.
If uncertainty is low, the chances that large upward jumps happen less often. In
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this case, a better strategy will be to wait in the discovery phase and invest after the
upward jumps are realized, instead of investing earlier and hoping that the upward
jumps will happen during the development phase which will lead to sooner finish.
Earlier investment means giving up the upward jumps for free, especially when
these jumps are more valuable when uncertainty is low since they happen less often.
Since the the upward jumps are more valuable when uncertainty is low, it is more
important to capture them by investing later when the current quality is higher,
which is represented by a higher optimal investment threshold. In other words, the
“quality effect” is larger when R goes up with lower uncertainty. Although the “NPV
effect” tends to encourage sooner investment, it is limited by the “quality effect”.
Sooner investment reduces the value of the project when uncertainty is low since the
valuable upward jumps are given up. The stronger “quality effect” when uncertainty
is low makes the optimal investment threshold goes up faster.
When uncertainty is high, the “quality effect” is weaker since even if earlier
investment means giving up the upward jumps in the discovery phase for free, it is
more likely that these jumps will happen in the development phase. Hence it is less
important to guarantee that the benefits of upward jumps must be captured before
investment. And these jumps are less valuable in the sense that they happen more
often. Moreover, “NPV effect” is stronger since sooner investment is a possibility.
The combination of the two effects leads to slower increase in the threshold when R
goes up with higher uncertainty.
Since the “quality effect”, which leads to the increase of the investment threshold,
is much stronger when uncertainty is low while the “NPV effect”, which reduces
the investment threshold, becomes stronger when uncertainty is higher, the spread
of the maximum and minimum value of the investment threshold decreases as the
remuneration level R increases. Moreover, the spread is also related to the value
of sunk cost. The higher the sunk cost, the higher the spread. This is because the
“NPV effect” is even weaker when I is large while the “quality effect” is not affect.
The combination of the two effects makes the spread larger.
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5.5. ANALYSIS OF THRESHOLDS AND PROJECT VALUES
Next we compare the value of the decentralized project with the social planner’s
project.
Proposition 5.11 The value of the project run by the social planner is greater than
the decentralized one.
See the calculations and comparisons of project values in the Appendix.
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Fig. 5.3 The difference of project
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q < qII < q
I
c.
Two examples are provided to show the
difference of the project values. Figure 5.3
shows the different project values when the start
value of the stochastic process q is smaller than
the investment thresholds of both projects, i.e.,
q < qII < q
I
c. The parameter values are: q = 0.3,
µ1 = 0.02, µ2 = 0.2, σ = [0.001,0.9], I = 0.5,
ρ = 0.5, C = 5, K = 10, R = 7. In this case, the
best strategy of both decision maker is to wait
until each investment threshold is reached before
paying the sunk cost. It is shown that the value
of the social planner’s project is strictly larger than the decentralized one.
Intuitively, although optimal decisions are made in both projects, the maximiza-
tion problem that qII solves is an unconstrained one, while q
I
c solves a constrained
maximization problem, in which the pharmaceutical company moves next for a
given quality standard set by the government in advance. In this case, the option
value of the pharmaceutical company’s project cannot be fully captured, which leads
to the lower total value of the decentralized project. In addition, as uncertainty σ
goes up, the value of the decentralized project increases slower which also proves
that part of the option value is not captured when uncertainty increases, since the
decision of pharmaceutical company is limited by the action of the government.
Figure 5.4 shows the different project values when the start value of the stochastic
process q is larger than the investment thresholds of both projects, i.e., qII < q
I
c < q.
The parameter values are: q = 2, µ1 = 0.02, µ2 = 0.2, σ = [0.001,0.9], I = 1,
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ρ = 0.5, C = 5, K = 10, R = 20. In this case, both projects will start immediately
without further waiting and it is shown that the social planner’s project value is
strictly larger than the decentralized one.
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In this case, the decision made by the govern-
ment is also affected by the response of the phar-
maceutical company in the decentralized project.
In other words, the government, although moves
first by setting a quality standard, also solves
a constrained maximization problem restricted
by what the pharmaceutical company will react
given the quality standard set. Thus the opti-
mal investment threshold qAc does not maximize
the unconstrained value function NPV(x) (see
Appendix). Hence the total value of the decen-
tralized project is less than the social planner’s project. In addition, as uncertainty
goes up, both project values decrease. This is because both projects have no flexi-
bilities but to invest immediately at this point. Without options of waiting, the bad
outcomes cannot be avoided, thus increasing uncertainty reduces the value of both
projects.
5.6 Policy implications
Several policy implications can be drawn from the model.
First, the social planner’s project better suits the development of drugs for the
NTDs. The greatest problem of NTDs is not about the quality of the products but
the problem of being lack of investment to start the corresponding projects in the
first place. Compared with the projects that are financed by using advance purchase
commitments (APCs), the social planner’s project considers both the decisions of
earlier investment and the quality of the product at the same time. Also it is proved
that the social planner’s project tends to start earlier or has greater probability of
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starting the project within certain amount of time under all parameter values, which
is exactly what the patients are in great need of.
Second, the decentralized project, which is financed by advance purchase com-
mitments, is a better managerial structure in terms of adjusting the quality of the
product. More specifically, a higher remuneration level, which is agreed by both
parties before investments, will lead to higher quality of the drug. However, the
investment will also be delayed. Moreover, when the remuneration level is below
certain threshold, the social planner’s project does not only start sooner so that it
has the potential of providing patients with earlier treatments, but also makes higher
quality of the product. In this case, the social planner’s project is the best option.
Thus the managerial structure to be chosen is dependent on the budget constraint of
the authority. In a word, if the budget of the authority is limited, the social planner’s
project should be chose. If there is no budget constraint, dependent on whether the
priority is an earlier investment or the quality of drug, both social planner’s project
and the decentralized project are possible.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we analyze how structural difference will help address the lack
of investment incentives in the R&D projects for NTDs. Dependent upon the
roles the government plays in different projects, we compare the decentralized
project and the social planner’s project. In the decentralized project, the government
is both a regulator, who determines the quality standard of the product, and a
sponsor, who agrees to purchase the final product if the quality standard is met. The
pharmaceutical company is the “policy taker” whose only decision is to optimally
start the development phase, given the quality standard set by the government. In
the social planner’s project, the government is in charge of the whole project by
setting the optimal quality standard as well as considering the optimal investment
timing. The different roles that government play in the two projects have led to
several different results.
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The comparison of the two models shows that the optimal investment threshold
of the social planner’s project is strictly less than the one of the decentralized project
and the social planner’s project will always start sooner. Since we assume that the
growth rate will increase dramatically after investment, i.e., µ2 > µ1, the project with
sooner investment will also finish sooner in expectation. Thus the social planner’s
project is a better choice if the unmet clinical needs are required to satisfied in a
short time.
Subsequently, we analyze the effect of the remuneration level R on the optimal
investment threshold of the decentralized project. It is found that the social planner’s
project is a better choice in terms of sooner start and higher optimal quality standard,
if the sunk cost of the project is relatively low and the sponsor does not have enough
funding for remuneration. On the other hand, with sufficient funding, remuneration
can be used as a great tool to adjust the quality standard, which is not achievable
in the social planner’s project. However, the increase in the quality standard also
means late commercialization. Thus, the decentralized project is more suitable for
the purpose of developing a product with higher quality and is not in urgent. For
instance, if a project aims to develop a more effective product for certain disease
to replace the current one, the decentralized project will be a better choice in that
the quality standard can be easily controlled by setting different remuneration level,
while this is impossible for the social planner’s project.
Furthermore, we discuss how investment threshold of the decentralized project
varies with uncertainty under different remuneration levels and sunk costs. The
results show that the investment threshold increases faster as the remuneration
level increases with lower uncertainty. This is because the upward jumps are more
valuable in the sense they happen less often when uncertainty is low, and it is
more important to capture the jumps before investment. Hence as the remuneration
level goes up, which leads to higher quality standard, the investment threshold of
the decentralized project goes up faster under lower uncertainty than under higher
uncertainty.
97
5.7. CONCLUSIONS
A possible extension of the model is to endogenize the remuneration level R in
the decentralized project. In practice, an endogenized R is more reasonable since
the revenues that the company will receive are limited by some budget constraint of
the government and should be determined by the maximization problems of both
parties. However, two problems will occur if the revenue R is endogenized.
First, if the value function of the government is to be maximized regarding both
the quality of the product qAc and the revenue R, there will be no closed form solution
of R (see equation 5.20), since qIc is a nonlinear function of R (see proposition 5.2).
Second, if R is endogenized, although the value of the decentralized project is
maximized, the remuneration level will no longer serve as a useful tool to adjust the
quality standard of the project. Moreover, as it has been proved that, under the same
budget constraint, the centralized project has greater value no matter what. In other
words, if the objective is to maximize the value of the project, the decentralized
project will never be an optimal choice.
Thus this chapter uses an exogenous R which, on one hand, avoids the problem
of not getting a closed form solution of R if it is endogenized. On the other hand, an
exogenous R provides the decentralized project with the opportunity to shine when
the quality standard instead of the value of the project being the priority of patients
and the government.
Finally, it is proved that the value of the social planner’s project strictly dominates
the decentralized project. Because the problem that the social planner solves is
an unconstrained maximization problem while the problems of the pharmaceutical
company and the government are two constrained maximization problems. Hence
the sum of the two players’ project values is less than the social planner’s project
value.
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5.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5.1
We start by looking at the quadratic equation:
Q(β ) =
1
2
σ2β (β −1)+µβ −ρ = 0. (5.30)
β1 > 0 is one of the two roots of the above equation.
Implicit differentiation ofQ(β1) = 0 with respect to µ gives
∂Q(β1)
∂β1
∂β1
∂µ
+
∂Q(β1)
∂µ
= 0⇔ ∂β1
∂µ
=− ∂Q(β1)/∂µ
∂Q(β1)/∂β1
. (5.31)
The denominator can be computed easily since the graph ofQ(β ) is a U-shape
parabola and ∂Q(β1)/∂β1 > 0.
From the direct derivatives
∂Q(β1)
∂µ
= β1 > 0. (5.32)
So it follows that
∂β1
∂µ
< 0. (5.33)
Since we assume that µ1 < µ2, β1(µ1)> β1(µ2), so
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2) = 1+
β1(µ2)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2) . (5.34)
Since β1(µ1)> β1(µ2), β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)> 0,
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2) > 1. (5.35)

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Proof of Proposition 5.2
The optimal quality threshold can be computed by taking the first order derivatives
of equation 5.15 with respect to qIc when q≤ qIc
∂V S(q)
∂qIc
=−β1(µ1)qβ1(µ1)(qIc)−β1(µ1)−1
[(
qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)(R−C
ρ
)
− I
]
+qβ1(µ1)(qIc)
−β1(µ1)
[
β1(µ2)(qIc)
β1(µ2)
(
R−C
ρ
)]
(5.36)
and ∂V
S(q)
∂qIc
= 0 gives
qIc = q
A
c
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
]1/β1(µ2)
. (5.37)
The second order derivative of equation 5.15 with respect to qAc is
∂ 2V S(q)
∂ 2qIc
=qβ1(µ1)(qIc)
−β1(µ1)−2
[
β1(µ1)(β1(µ1)
−β1(µ2))
(
qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)(R−C
ρ
)
−β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)+1)I
]
. (5.38)
Substituting
(
qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)
with β1(µ1)β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C ,
∂ 2V S(q)
∂ 2qIc
=qβ1(µ1)(qIc)
−β1(µ1)−2
[
β1(µ1)(β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)) β1(µ1)β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
R−C
ρ
− (β1(µ1)+1)β1(µ1)I
]
=qβ1(µ1)(qIc)
−β1(µ1)−2
[
−β1(µ1)I
]
. (5.39)
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Since qβ1(µ1) > 0 and (qIc)
−β1(µ1)−2 > 0, ∂
2V S(q)
∂ 2qIc
< 0. qIc is the the optimal
investment threshold that maximizes the pharmaceutical company’s project value.

Proof of Proposition 5.4
The optimal quality threshold can be computed by taking the first order derivatives
of the value function in Proposition 5.3, when q < qIc, with respect to q
A
c , and
substituting qIc with q
I
c = q
A
c
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
]1/β1(µ2)
as it is in Proposition 5.2,
∂V F(q)
∂qAc
=qβ1(µ2)
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
] β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)
β1(µ2)
×
[
−β1(µ2)(qAc )−β1(µ2)−1
(
KqAc −R
ρ
)
+(qAc )
−β1(µ2)K
ρ
]
. (5.40)
For computational convenience, denote
M = qβ1(µ2)
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
] β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)
β1(µ2)
. (5.41)
∂V F (q)
∂qAc
can be rewritten as
∂V F(q)
∂qAc
= M
[
−β1(µ2)(qAc )−β1(µ2)−1
(
KqAc −R
ρ
)
+(qAc )
−β1(µ2)K
ρ
]
(5.42)
and ∂V
F (q)
∂qAc
= 0 gives
qAc =
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−1
R
K
. (5.43)
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The second order derivative of equation 5.19 with respect to qAc is
∂ 2V F(q)
∂ 2qAc
= M(qAc )
−β1(µ2)−2
[
β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)+1)
KqAc −R
ρ
− 2Kq
A
c
ρ
β1(µ2)
]
.
(5.44)
Since qAc =
β1(µ2)
β1(µ2)−1
(C
K
)
,
β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)+1)
KqAc −R
ρ
− 2Kq
A
c
ρ
β1(µ2)
=β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)−1)Kq
A
c
ρ
−β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)+1)Rρ
=β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)−1)Kρ
β1(µ2)
β1(µ2)−1
R
K
−β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)+1)Rρ
=− R
ρ
β1(µ2)< 0. (5.45)
Because M and qAc are both positive,
∂ 2V F (q)
∂ 2qAc
< 0.
And it can also be proved that qAc maximizes the value function shown in the
Proposition 5.3, when qIc ≤ q < qAc .
∂V F(q)
∂qAc
= (−β1(µ2))
(
q
qcA
)β1(µ2)( 1
qAc
)(
KqAc −R
ρ
)
+
(
q
qcA
)β1(µ2) K
ρ
(5.46)
and ∂V
F (q)
∂qAc
= 0 gives
qAc =
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−1
R
K
. (5.47)
The first order condition then becomes,
∂V F(q)
∂qAc
=
(
q(β1(µ2)−1)K
β1(µ2)R
)β1(µ2)( R
(β1(µ2)−1)ρ
)
> 0. (5.48)
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The second order condition is,
∂ 2V F(q)
∂ 2qAc
=(−β1(µ2))
(
q
qAc
)β1(µ2)( 1
qAc
)[
(1−β1(µ2))Kρ +
β1(µ2)R
qcAρ
]
+
(
q
qAc
)β1(µ2)(
− 1
(qAc )2
β1(µ2)R
ρ
)
. (5.49)
When qAc =
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−1
R
K ,
∂ 2V F(q)
∂ 2qAc
=
(
q
qAc
)β1(µ2)(
− β1(µ2)R
(β1(µ2)−1)K
)
< 0 (5.50)
Thus qAc is the optimal quality standard which maximizes the value of the
government’s project. 
Proof of the Proposition 5.5
The partial derivatives of V I(q) in equation 5.22 with respect to qII is
∂V I(q)
∂qII
=qβ1(µ1)(qII)
β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)−1(qAI )
−β1(µ2)
(
KqAI −C
ρ
)
(β1(µ2)−β1(µ1))
+qβ1(µ1)(qII)
−β1(µ1)−1β1(µ1)I (5.51)
and ∂V
I(q)
∂qII
= 0 gives qII = q
A
I
(
β1(µ1)I
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρ
KqAI −C
)1/β1(µ1)
.
The partial derivatives of V I(q) with respect to qAI is
∂V I(q)
∂qAI
=qβ1(µ1)(qII)
β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)
×
[
−β1(µ2)(qAI )−β1(µ2)−1
(
KqAI −C
ρ
)
+(qAI )
−β1(µ2)K
ρ
]
(5.52)
and ∂V
I(q)
∂qAI
= 0 gives qAI =
β1(µ2)
β1(µ2)−1
(C
K
)
.
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The second partial derivatives of V I(q) with respect to qII is:
∂ 2V I(q)
(∂qII)2
=qβ1(µ1)(β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)−1)(β1(µ2)−β1(µ1))(qII)β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)−2
× (qAI )−β1(µ2)
(
KqAI −C
ρ
)
−qβ1(µ1)(β1(µ1)+1)β1(µ1)(qII)−β1(µ1)−2I
=(qII)
−β1(µ1)−2
[
qβ1(µ1)(β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)−1)( q
I
I
qAI
)β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)−β1(µ1))
×
(
KqAI −C
ρ
)
−qβ1(µ1)(β1(µ1)+1)β1(µ1)I
]
=(qII)
−β1(µ1)−2
[
qβ1(µ1)(β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)−1)(β1(µ2)−β1(µ1))
× β1(µ1)I
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2) −q
β1(µ1)(β1(µ1)+1)β1(µ1)I
]
=− (qII)−β1(µ1)−2
[
qβ1(µ1)β1(µ1)β1(µ2)I
]
< 0. (5.53)
The second partial derivatives of V I(q) with respect to qAI is:
∂ 2V I(q)
(∂qAI )2
=qβ1(µ1)(qII)
β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)K
ρ
(1−β1(µ2))(−β1(µ2))(qAI )−β1(µ2)−1
− (β1(µ2)+1)β1(µ2)qβ1(µ2)(qII)β1(µ2)−β1(µ2)(qAI )−β1(µ2)−2
(
C
ρ
)
=qβ1(µ1)(qII)
β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)(qAI )
−β1(µ2)−2
[
K
ρ
(β1(µ2)−1)(β1(µ2))qAI
− (β1(µ2)+1)β1(µ2)
(
C
ρ
)]
=−qβ1(µ1)(qII)β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)(qAI )−β1(µ2)−2β1(µ2)
(
C
ρ
)
< 0. (5.54)
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The derivatives of V I(q) with respect to qII and q
A
I is:
∂ 2V I(q)
∂qII∂qAI
=(β1(µ2)−β1(µ1))(qII)β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)−1(qAI )−β1(µ2)
×
[
qβ1(µ1)
K
ρ
(1−β1(µ2))+β1(µ2)qβ1(µ1) 1qAI
(
C
ρ
)]
=(β1(µ2)−β1(µ1))(qII)β1(µ2)−β1(µ1)−1(qAI )−β1(µ2)
×
[
qβ1(µ1)
K
ρ
(1−β1(µ2))+β1(µ2)qβ1(µ1)β1(µ2)−1β1(µ2)
K
ρ
]
=0. (5.55)
Thus
D =
∂ 2V I(q)
(∂qII)2
∂ 2V I(q)
(∂qAI )2
−
(
∂ 2V I(q)
∂qII∂qAI
)2
> 0. (5.56)
Hence it is proved that the value of project run by the social planner V I(q) is
maximized if the development phase starts at qII and the quality standard is set to be
qAI . 
Proof of the Product of Two Non-Negative and Convex Functions
is a Convex Function
In general, the product of two non-negative and convex functions is also a convex
function. The proof is as follows:
Choose x and y in the domain with x < y and t in [0,1] and consider the function
H(x) = f (x)g(x), (5.57)
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with both f (x) and g(x) non-negative and convex.
H[tx+(1− t)y]− [tH(x)+(1− t)H(y)]
= f [tx+(1− t)y]g[tx+(1− t)y]− [t f (x)g(x)+(1− t) f (y)g(y)]
≤ [t f (x)+(1− t f (y))] [tg(x)+(1− t)g(y)]− [t f (x)g(x)+(1− t) f (y)g(y)]
≤t2 f (x)g(x)+ t(1− t) f (x)g(y)+ t(1− t) f (y)g(x)+(1− t)2 f (y)g(y)− t f (x)g(x)
− (1− t) f (y)g(y)
≤t f (x)g(x)+(1− t) f (y)g(y)− t f (x)g(x)− (1− t) f (y)g(y)
=0. (5.58)
Hence H[tx+ (1− t)y] ≤ [tH(x) + (1− t)H(y)] and it proves that H(x) is a
convex function.
Proof of Proposition 5.7
Rewrite qII by substituting q
A
I ,
qII = q
A
I
(
β1(µ1)I
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρ
KqAI −C
)1/β1(µ2)
= qAI
(
β1(µ1)I
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρ(β1−1)
C
)1/β1(µ2)
=
β1(µ2)
β1(µ2)−1
(
C
K
)(
β1(µ1)I
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρ(β1−1)
C
)1/β1(µ2)
. (5.59)
Then rewrite qIc by substituting q
A
c ,
qIc = q
A
c
(
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
)1/β1(µ2)
=
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−1
(
R
K
)(
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
)1/β1(µ2)
. (5.60)
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Divide qIc by q
I
I ,
W (C) =
qIc
qII
=
β1(µ1)(β1(µ2)−1)
β1(µ2)(β1(µ1)−1)
(
R
C
)(
C
R−C
1
β1(µ2)−1
)1/β1(µ2)
. (5.61)
Take the first order derivative of W (C) with respect to C,
∂W (C)/∂C
A
=
(
− 1
C2
)(
C
R−C
)1/β1(µ2)
+
1
C
1
β1(µ2)
(
C
R−C
)1/β1(µ2)−1 R
(R−C)2 ,
(5.62)
where
A =
β1(µ1)(β1(µ2)−1)
β1(µ2)(β1(µ1)−1)
(
1
β1(µ2)−1
)1/β1(µ2)
. (5.63)
And ∂W (C)/∂CA = 0 gives
C =
(
β1(µ2)−1
β1(µ2)
)
R. (5.64)
The ratio q
I
c
qII
can be treated as a function of C. Consider the two functions
f1(C) = 1C and f2(C) =
( C
R−C
)1/β1(µ2). f1(C) is convex for every value of C. For
computational convenience, denote α = 1/β1(µ2) and
∂ 2 f2(C)
∂ 2C
=
∂ 2
( C
R−C
)α
∂ 2C
=Rα
{
Cα−2(R−C)−α−2 [(α−1)(R−C)+C((α+1)]}
=Rα
{
Cα−2(R−C)−α−2 [2C− (1−α)R]} . (5.65)
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When C =
(
β1(µ2)−1
β1(µ2)
)
R,
∂ 2 f2(C)
∂ 2C
=Rα
{
Cα−2(R−C)−α−2 (1−α)R}
=Rα
{
Cα−2(R−C)−α−2
(
β1(µ2)−1
β1(µ2)
)
R
}
> 0. (5.66)
Hence, the function f2(C) is convex on the point C =
(
β1(µ2)−1
β1(µ2)
)
R.
Since both functions f1(C) and f2(C) are non-negative and convex, the product
of two non-negative and convex functions is also a convex function. See Appendix.
Because W
[(
β1(µ2)−1
β1(µ2)
)
R
]
= β1(µ1)β1(µ1)−1 > 1, the ratio W (C) =
qIc
qII
is larger than 1
when it takes the minimum value, which shows that qIc > q
I
I . 
Proof of Proposition 5.8
If qAc < q
A
I , (see proposition 5.4 and equation 5.24), the following condition must be
satisfied:
R <
(β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)C. (5.67)
However, equation 5.28 will also be satisfied at the same time. Thus,
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)ρI+C < R <
(β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)C. (5.68)
Equation 5.68 only holds if the sunk cost of the project I satisfies,
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)ρI+C <
(β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)C, (5.69)
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or
I <
(β1(µ1)−β1(µ2))2C
β1(µ1)2(β1(µ2)−1)ρ . (5.70)
Since it is by assumption that qIc < q
A
c and it has been proved that q
I
I < q
I
c ,
qII < q
I
c < q
A
c < q
A
I . 
Proof of Proposition 5.9
If qAI ≤ qAc , (see proposition 5.4 and equation 5.24), the following condition must be
satisfied:
R≥ (β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)C. (5.71)
Since by assumption, qIc ≤ qAc , the following condition holds
R >
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)ρI+C. (5.72)
If
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)ρI+C <
(β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)C, (5.73)
the sunk cost I will be satisfying
I <
(β1(µ1)−β1(µ2))2C
β1(µ1)2(β1(µ2)−1)ρ . (5.74)
Hence
R≥ (β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)C. (5.75)
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Next we prove that there is a unique Rc which makes qIc = q
A
I . Take the
first order derivative of qIc with respect to R, we will find that
∂qIc
∂R < 0 if R ∈[
(β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)C,
β1(µ2)
β1(µ2)−1C
)
and ∂q
I
c
∂R ≥ 0 if R ∈
[
β1(µ2)
β1(µ2)−1C,∞
)
.
Moreover,
β1(µ2)
β1(µ2)−1C−
(β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)C =
β1(µ2)C
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1) > 0. (5.76)
When R = (β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)C,
qIc =
β1(µ2)
β1(µ2)−1
C
K
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
]1/β1(µ2)
= qAI
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
]1/β1(µ2)
. (5.77)
By assumption,
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
]1/β1(µ2)
< 1, thus qIc < q
A
I .
Since
qIc =
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−1
R
K
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)
ρI
R−C
]1/β1(µ2)
, (5.78)
to see what happen to qIc when R goes to infinity, we compute limR→+∞ R(R−C)1/β1(µ2)
by using L’Hospital’s Rule and limR→∞ R(R−C)1/β1(µ2) = limR→∞β1(µ2)(R−C)
1−1/β1(µ2)=
+∞> qAI . Thus there is a unique Rc makes qIc = qAI .
It is by assumption that qIc < q
A
I and q
I
I < q
I
c. In conclusion, q
I
I < q
I
c < q
A
I ≤ qAc
on
[
(β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)C,Rc
)
and qII < q
A
I ≤ qIc < qAc on
[
Rc,∞
)
.
If the Equation 5.73 is changed to be
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)ρI+C ≥
(β1(µ1)−1)β1(µ2)
(β1(µ2)−1)β1(µ1)C, (5.79)
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the sunk cost I will be satisfying
I ≥ (β1(µ1)−β1(µ2))
2C
β1(µ1)2(β1(µ2)−1)ρ . (5.80)
Hence
R≥ β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)ρI+C. (5.81)
There are only two differences in the conclusion which is to change the start value
to R = β1(µ1)β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)ρI+C and denote the critical value that makes q
I
c = q
A
I as Rcc.
The rest of the proofs are the same. The final conclusion will be qII < q
I
c < q
A
I ≤ qAc
on
[
β1(µ1)
β1(µ1)−β1(µ2)ρI+C,Rcc
)
and qII < q
A
I ≤ qIc < qAc on
[
Rcc,∞
)
. 
Proof of Proposition 5.11
Dependent on the initial value of product’s quality q, the total value of the projects
are different.
When q < qII < q
I
c, the total value of both projects are:
V S(q)+V F(q) =
(
q
qIc
)β1(µ1)[( qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)(KqAc −C
ρ
)
− I
]
(5.82)
and
V I(q) =
(
q
qII
)β1(µ1)[( qII
qAI
)β1(µ2)(KqAI −C
ρ
)
− I
]
. (5.83)
qII and q
I
c are the optimal investment thresholds of both projects and they solve
the maximization problems of the social planner’s project and the pharmaceutical
company’s project respectively. However, the maximization problem of the social
planner’s project is an unconstrained problem while the maximization problem of
the pharmaceutical company’s problem is limited by the quality standard set by
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the government. In this case, the option value of the pharmaceutical company is
not fully captured which leads to lower project value. Thus the total value of the
decentralized project is lower than the social planner’s project.
When qII < q
I
c < q, both projects start immediately. The total value of both
projects are:
V S(q)+V F(q) =
(
q
qAc
)β1(µ2)(KqAc −C
ρ
)
− I (5.84)
and
V I(q) =
(
q
qAI
)β1(µ2)(KqAI −C
ρ
)
− I. (5.85)
In general, the total value of each project can be represented by the following
function:
NPV (x) =
(q
x
)β1(µ2)(Kx−C
ρ
)
− I, (5.86)
where x > 0.
Take the first order derivative of NPV (x) wrt x,
NPV
′
(x) = qβ1(µ2)x−β1(µ2)−1
(
(1−β1(µ2))Kxρ +
C
ρ
β1(µ2)
)
. (5.87)
It is shown that NPV
′
(x)> 0 if 0 < x < β1(µ2)β1(µ2)−1
C
K = q
A
I , NPV
′
(x) = 0 if x = qAI
and NPV
′
(x)< 0 if x > qAI .
Now take the second order derivative of NPV (x) wrt x,
NPV
′′
(x) = qβ1(µ2)[−β1(µ2)]x−β1(µ2)−2
[
(1−β1(µ2))xKρ +
C
ρ
(β1(µ2)+1)
]
.
(5.88)
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It is shown that NPV
′′
(x)> 0 if x > β1(µ2)+1β1(µ2)−1
C
K = q
A
I +
C
(β1(µ2)−1)K , NPV
′
(x) = 0
if x = β1(µ2)+1β1(µ2)−1
C
K and NPV
′
(x)< 0 if 0 < x < β1(µ2)+1β1(µ2)−1
C
K .
In conclusion, NPV (x) is an increasing concave function on (0,qAI ) and reaches
its maximum at qAI . Then it decreases and remains being concave on (q
A
I ,q
A
I +
C
(β1(µ2)−1)K ) then it keeps decreasing and being convex on [q
A
I +
C
(β1(µ2)−1)K ,∞).
Thus,
(
q
qAI
)β1(µ2)(KqAI −C
ρ
)
− I >
(
q
qAc
)β1(µ2)(KqAc −C
ρ
)
− I. (5.89)
And it is proved that the value of the social planner’s project is strictly larger
than the decentralized project when qII < q
I
c < q.
When qII < q < q
I
c, the social planner’s project starts immediately while the
decentralized project has not started yet. The total value of both projects are:
V S(q)+V F(q) =
(
q
qIc
)β1(µ1)[( qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)(KqAc −C
ρ
)
− I
]
(5.90)
and
V I(q) =
(
q
qAI
)β1(µ2)(KqAI −C
ρ
)
− I. (5.91)
Since the total value of the social planner’s project is larger than the decentralized
project when q ∈ [0,qII)∪ [qIc,+∞], if V I(q) is more convex on [qII,qIc), V I(q) >
V S(q)+V F(q).
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Take the second order derivatives of Equation 5.91 with respect to q and
[
V S(q)+V F(q)
]′′
=
(
q
qIc
)β1(µ1)[( qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)(KqAc −C
ρ
)
− I
]
×β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)−1) 1q2
<
(
q
qIc
)β1(µ2)[( qIc
qAc
)β1(µ2)(KqAc −C
ρ
)
− I
]
×β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)−1) 1q2
<
(
q
qAc
)β1(µ2)(KqAc −C
ρ
)
β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)−1) 1q2
<
(
q
qAI
)β1(µ2)(KqAI −C
ρ
)
β1(µ2)(β1(µ2)−1) 1q2
=
[
V I(q)
]′′
. (5.92)
Hence we have proved that V I(q) is more convex on [qII,q
I
c). Thus the project
value of the social planner’s project is larger than the decentralized one. 
114
Chapter 6
Gambling or Investment? A
Time-Constrained Pharmaceutical
Investment Decision under
Uncertainty
6.1 Abstract
This chapter discusses whether a time-constrained pharmaceutical R&D project
provides with more investment incentives to tackle the lack of investment problem
on Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs). The success of the project is modeled by
a Poisson process, which is assumed to be independent of the process of revenues.
We claim that the intensity of the Poisson process plays an important role in the
investment decisions if both time-to-expiration and the sudden success of the projects
are considered simultaneously. The model shows that two effects determine the
investment threshold of the time-constrained project: the investment effect and the
gamble effect. The investment effect will reduce the optimal investment threshold
while the gamble effect will increase it. Moreover the numerical results show that
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the time-constrained project does provide with more investment incentives, when
the life remaining of the project is longer, intensity of the Poisson process is higher
and when uncertainty of revenues is lower.
6.2 Introduction
The problem to tackle the Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) in developing
countries has been long recognized. Trouiller et al. (2002) found that the infectious
diseases present a huge burden expressed as millions of disability adjusted life-years
(DALYs) in developing countries and together account for 11.4% of the global
disease burden. However, only 1% of the 1393 new chemical entities marketed
between 1975 and 1999 were registered for these diseases, in which 13 for Neglected
Tropical Diseases (NTDs) and three for tuberculosis. The reason for the lack of
investment problem is that the people who suffer from these diseases are mostly
from developing countries with low income and they can not afford to pay for the
drugs. Thus the pharmaceutical companies have no incentives to start these risky
projects that subject to various technological and political uncertainties.
To address the lack of investment problem, the push and pull mechanisms
proposed in the literature may serve to promote research into neglected infectious
diseases (Mueller-Langer (2013)). Among all, the Advance Purchase Commitments
(APC) is one of the best ways to increase investment incentives by assuring a future
solid market. The Center for Global Development (CGD), with the support of
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation published a report in 2005 recommending
how advance market commitments for vaccines could be implemented Levine et al.
(2005).
However, most of these commitments only specify specific technologies with
certain quantities in the future at a guaranteed unit price (Farlow (2004)), without
setting time constraints on the drug development process. In order words, the
decision maker has an infinitely lived option to start the project. Moreover, the R&D
process can last forever until some new product is developed once the project starts.
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However, the assumption that the decision maker (DM) owns a perpetual investment
option in the pharmaceutical industry seems too strong, since patients who are in
serious medical conditions can not afford to wait forever. In this chapter, the thesis
investigates how investment decisions are affected if a time constraint is added to
the pharmaceutical R&D project.
Following Myers (1977), it is quite natural to think of many investment problems
that feature irreversibility, flexibility and uncertainty as real options. Many phar-
maceutical R&D projects can be fitted in this framework since they exhibit these
features. Firstly, the cost spent on developing a drug is usually high and irreversible
since it will not be recovered if the research turns out to be a failure or the project is
abandoned in the meantime. Secondly, most of the decisions do not have to be made
right away. Waiting while collecting useful information will usually help make a
better decision. Lastly, the payoffs of projects are usually full of uncertainties in
that the price and demand of drugs are usually not known ex ante. Because of these
features, initiating the project at different time will lead to huge differences on the
potential profits.
In the real options literature, there are many models that assume the investment
decisions are allowed to be made within an unlimited time horizon. For instance, in
the models that Schwartz and Moon (1996) and Hsu and Schwartz (2008) proposed
to evaluate the pharmaceutical R&D projects, there are no time constraints for the
investment decisions. The decision maker can wait forever until the condition is
favorable enough before investment. However, in many practical cases, this is not
realistic. In our models, we assume that the option of delaying investment does not
live infinitely, but subject to a time constraint, say a T years time. This is similar to
the real options models that are developed to evaluate the natural resource options,
such as the valuation of a mine (Brennan and Schwartz (1985)) or the petroleum
leases (Paddock et al. (1988)), where deadlines or time-to-expiration of the projects
are also considered.
Another characteristic of the pharmaceutical R&D project is that the time that
the project being successful is not know ex ante. For instance, the project may be
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successful because of a major breakthrough of new technology. Such situation is
usually modeled by using a Poisson process, with which the time between jumps
follow exponential distribution. This is not new in the real options literature. For
instance, the value of a project that exponentially decays or the project with sudden
death can also be modeled by using this approach (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).
The contribution of this chapter is that we provide with an evaluation method
of a time-constrained pharmaceutical R&D project, of which success is modeled
by using Poisson process. In other words, we consider a model with both time-to-
expiration and sudden success of the project. Compared to other real options models
to evaluate pharmaceutical R&D projects, such as Schwartz and Moon (1996), Hsu
and Schwartz (2008) and Schwartz (2004), the model in this paper is different in
two ways.
First, the intensity of the Poisson process, besides adding to the discount rate,
also influences the timing of the investment decision by altering the success proba-
bility of the project, when time-to-expiration is considered. In Hsu and Schwartz
(2008), the Poisson process is used to model catastrophic events when the decision
maker is not limited by the time horizon. And it is argued that, if uncorrelated
with the market, the intensity simply enters into the analysis through increasing
the discount rates. We show that the intensity is more than simply adding to the
discount rate.
Second, we model the sudden success of the project instead of the catastrophic
events by using the Poisson process, which is different with the model of Schwartz
(2004). In their paper, although time-to-expiration is also considered, the intensity
simply adds to the discount rate since the catastrophic events do not have influence
on the success probability of the project. In other words, intensity will have great
impact on the investment decisions only if a) The success of the project is modeled
by a Poisson process and b) When the project is of limited time horizon, are both
satisfied simultaneously. Otherwise, the intensity is a less important parameter
which does not have decisive effects on the investment decisions.
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In this chapter, pharmaceutical R&D projects with and without time constraints
are compared and there are three main findings. First, when the success of a time-
constrained pharmaceutical R&D project is modeled by the Poisson process, the
investment effect and the gamble effect determines the optimal investment thresholds
of the project at any given time as the life remaining of the project decreases. The
investment effect will reduce the optimal investment threshold while the gamble
effect will increase it. Second, the intensity of the Poisson process will only have
influence on the investment effect while the uncertainty of the project will only
have impact on the gamble effect. Moreover, both effects increase as the project
approaches the deadline. Last, the time-constrained project provides with more
investment incentives, when intensity is higher and when uncertainty is lower.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follow. Section 6.3 introduces the
project with perpetual investment option. Section 6.4 discusses the time-constrained
project. In section 6.5, the comparative statics of the two projects are shown. Section
6.6 considers policy implications. Finally, section 6.7 concludes the chapter.
6.3 The Project with a Perpetual Investment Option
The following model and results in this section are not new in the real options
literature. They serve as benchmarks in order to compare with the model and results
in section 6.4.
The time line of the project is as follows:
0
Now
t
Cost incurred.
R&D starts
t+ τ¯
Jump observed and new
drug approved. Rev-
enues received.
R&D process
Consider a pharmaceutical company that has an opportunity to invest in a R&D
project without a deadline. The investment is irreversible and subject to a sunk cost
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I > 0 that is paid at the start of the project and a stream of cost flows C > 0 paid
for every period of the R&D process. An advance purchase commitments (APC)
contract is signed between the government and the pharmaceutical company, stating
that the government promises to purchase a certain quantity of the products from
the company, if the final product is proved to be successful anytime after investment.
The revenues of the company are uncertain and represented by a stochastic process
(Yt)t≥0, which follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM)
dYt = µYtdt+σYtdBt , (6.1)
where (Bt)t≥0 is a Wiener process, µ and σ are constants, and Y0 = y.
The R&D process is modeled as a Poisson process (qt)t≥0, with intensity λ , and
independent of (Bt)t≥0. We assume that the process starts when the investment takes
place and the start value is q0 = 0. The final product is considered to be successful
when the first jump is observed after investment, i.e., at the stopping time
τ¯ = inf{t ≥ 0|qt = 1}. (6.2)
It is assumed that the pharmaceutical company is risk neutral which discounts
projects at rate ρ > max{0,µ}. When the drug is successful, the company will be
receiving a stream of revenues, of which the value is dependent on the value of Yt at
that time:
F(Yt) = EYt
(∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)Ysds
)
=
Yt
ρ−µ . (6.3)
At the time of investment, the net present value (NPV) of the project is composed
of three parts: (1) the sunk cost paid immediately; (2) the sum of the discounted
cost flows during the R&D process and (3) the revenues received afterwards when
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the final product is successful. The NPV of the project at time t is:
G(Yt) = EYt
[(∫ t+τ¯
t
e−ρ(s−t)(−C)ds+
∫ ∞
t+τ¯
e−ρ(s−t)Ysds− I
)]
. (6.4)
Proposition 6.1 If the investment takes place at anytime t, the NPV of the project
at time t is
G(Yt) =
λYt
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λ −µ) −
(
C
ρ+λ
+ I
)
. (6.5)
See proof of Proposition 6.1 in the Appendix.
The pharmaceutical company wants to maximize the value of the project which
is denoted by the following optimal stopping problem:
F∗(y) = sup
τ
Ey
[
−
∫ τ+τ¯
τ
e−ρtCdt+
∫ ∞
τ+τ¯
e−ρtYtdt− e−ρτ I
]
= sup
τ
Ey
{
e−ρτEYτ
[
−
∫ τ¯
0
e−ρtCdt+
∫ ∞
τ¯
e−ρtYtdt− I
]}
= sup
τ
Ey
{
e−ρτ
[
λYτ
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λ −µ) −
(
C
ρ+λ
+ I
)]}
= sup
τ
Ey
[
e−ρτG(Yτ)
]
(6.6)
The stopping time of which the investment in R&D becomes optimal is denoted
by τ . As in most of the real options literature, the optimal stopping time takes the
form of the first hitting times of some threshold Y ∗. For Y ∗ > 0, denote the first
passage time of Y ∗ by τ(Y ∗) := inf{t ≥ 0 | Yt ≥ Y ∗}, which is the optimal time of
investment. Therefore, the problem can be written as
F∗(y) = sup
Y ∗
Ey
[
e−ρτ(Y
∗)G(Yτ(Y ∗))
]
= sup
Y ∗
Ey
[
e−ρτ(Y
∗)
]
G(Y ∗). (6.7)
121
6.3. THE PROJECT WITH A PERPETUAL INVESTMENT OPTION
In addition, the space [0,∞] can be divided into two regions by the critical value
Y ∗ in this problem. In [0,Y ∗), continuation (waiting) is optimal since the value
of investing immediately is less than the value of waiting. In [Y ∗,∞], termination
(invest immediately) is optimal since the value of investing immediately is equal to
the value of waiting. Hence [0,Y ∗) is the continuation region while [Y ∗,∞] is the
stopping region (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).
The characteristic operator of the process (Yt)t≥0, as we have seen before, is
LY =
1
2
σ2y2
∂ 2
∂y2
+µy
∂
∂y
. (6.8)
On the continuation region, the Bellman equation should hold, i.e.,LY F∗= ρF∗.
By substituting the expression of the characteristic operator and rearranging, we
have
1
2
σ2y2
∂ 2F∗
∂y2
+µy
∂F∗
∂y
−ρF∗ = 0, (6.9)
the general solution of which is of the form,
ϕ(y) = Ayβ1 +Byβ2, (6.10)
where β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are the two roots of the quadratic equation,
Q(β ) =
1
2
σ2β (β −1)+µβ −ρ = 0. (6.11)
The boundary condition ϕ(0) = 0 is satisfied only if B = 0, so that ϕ(y) = Ayβ1
on [0,Y ∗). By using Dynkin’s formula, the expected discount factor is
Ey
[
e−ρτ(Y
∗)
]
=
ϕ(y)
ϕ(Y ∗)
=
( y
Y ∗
)β1
, (6.12)
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so that Y ∗ can be obtained by solving
ϕ(Y ∗)G′(Y ∗) = ϕ ′(Y ∗)G(Y ∗). (6.13)
which yields
Y ∗ =
β1
β1−1
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λ −µ)
λ
(
C
ρ+λ
+ I
)
. (6.14)
Therefore the value of the project is:
F∗(y) =

( y
Y ∗
)β1 [ λY ∗
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λ−µ) −
(
C
ρ+λ + I
)]
i f y < Y ∗
λy
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λ−µ) −
(
C
ρ+λ + I
)
i f y≥ Y ∗.
(6.15)
The project value of the perpetual option depends on the current value y of the
stochastic process (Yt)t≥0. If the current value y is less than the optimal investment
threshold Y ∗, the optimal strategy of the pharmaceutical company is to wait and
invest when Y ∗ is reached. However, if the current value y is larger or equal to the
optimal investment threshold Y ∗, the optimal strategy is to invest or start the R&D
process right away.
6.4 The Time-Constrained Project
Now consider the case that another requirement is added in the previous advance
purchase commitments contract, which states that the final product needs to be
finished in T years time. After T years from now, the government will no longer
guarantee to purchase the product from the pharmaceutical company even if any
product is invented. Since the R&D process is modeled by a Poisson process, if a
jump happens within the time specified by the government, i.e., T years, the project
is considered to be successful and the pharmaceutical company will be rewarded.
However, if no jump is observed within time T , the project will keep incurring
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costs until time T and fails without receiving any revenues. Moreover, there is no
opportunity to resume research or restart the project from the scratch. In this case,
the value of the project does not only depend on the value of (Yt)t≥0, but also on
time itself.
The time line of the project is as follows:
0
Now
t
Cost incurred.
R&D starts
t+ τ¯
Revenues received if
a jump happens be-
fore T .
T t+ τ¯
No revenues received
if a jump happens af-
ter T .
R&D process
According to whether the jump happens by the time T , the NPV of the project
can be separated into two parts. One part is the revenues of the project net of all
the costs occurred before the jump happens, multiplied by the probability that the
jump happens. The other part is the sum of all the costs accumulated by time T ,
multiplied by the probability that the jump does not happen, and no revenues are
generated in this case.
The NPV of the project that at time t if t < T is
g(Yt , t) =EYt
[(∫ t+τ¯
t
e−ρ(s−t)(−C)ds+
∫ ∞
t+τ¯
e−ρ(s−t)Ysds− I
)
P(τ¯ < T − t)
+
(∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)(−C)ds− I
)
P(τ¯ ≥ T − t)
]
. (6.16)
Proposition 6.2 The NPV of the project is 0 if the investment takes place after time
T . For any time t < T at which the investment takes place, the NPV of the project is
g(Yt , t) =
[
λYt
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λ −µ) −
(
C
ρ+λ
+ I
)][
1− e−λ (T−t)
]
+
C
(
e−ρ(T−t)−1
)
ρ
− I
e−λ (T−t). (6.17)
See proof of Proposition 6.2 in the Appendix.
124
CHAPTER 6. GAMBLING OR INVESTMENT? A TIME-CONSTRAINED PHARMACEUTICAL INVESTMENT
DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY
The problem of the pharmaceutical company is to maximize the value of the
project, which is denoted by the following optimal stopping problem
F∗(y, t) = sup
τ≤T
Ey
[(∫ τ+τ¯
τ
e−ρs(−C)ds+
∫ ∞
τ+τ¯
e−ρsYsds− e−ρτ I
)
P(τ¯ < T − τ)
+
(∫ T
τ
e−ρs(−C)ds− e−ρτ I
)
P(τ¯ ≥ T − τ)
]
= sup
τ≤T
Ey
{
e−ρτEYτ
[(
−
∫ τ¯
0
e−ρsCds+
∫ ∞
τ¯
e−ρsYtds− I
)
×P(τ¯ < T − τ)+
(∫ T−τ
0
e−ρs(−C)ds− I
)
P(τ¯ ≥ T − τ)
]}
= sup
τ≤T
Ey
{
e−ρτ
[[
λYτ
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λ −µ) −
(
C
ρ+λ
+ I
)][
1− e−λ (T−τ)
]
+
C
(
e−ρ(T−τ)−1
)
ρ
− I
e−λ (T−τ)]

= sup
τ≤T
Ey
[
e−ρτg(Yτ ,τ)
]
. (6.18)
Since the project value is influenced by both (Yt)t≥0 and t, the continuation
region in this project is different from the one in the project of perpetual option.
We define the continuation region as C = {(Yt , t) : Yt ∈ [0,Y ∗(t)}, for t < T , where
waiting is the best strategy for the given contract length. And the stopping region is
define asS = {(Yt , t) : Yt ∈ [Y ∗(t),∞)}, for t < T , where the optimal strategy is to
invest immediately.
On the continuation region, the Bellman equation should hold
∂F∗
∂ t
+
1
2
σ2y2
∂ 2F∗
∂y2
+µy
∂F∗
∂y
−ρF∗ = 0. (6.19)
Because two state variables are involved in the time-constrained project, the
differential equations that emerge from dynamic programming are also partial
differential equations (PDE) with two state variables. And there is no general
solution for the PDE. Hence we are not able to compute the closed form of the
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expected discount factor by using Dynkin’s formula as in the previous case. Solution
of such equations typically requires numerical methods (see Dixit and Pindyck
(1994)). In what follows, we try to solve the above PDE numerically by using the
finite difference approximation.
To simplify the approximation, we first take the log transformation of the Bell-
man equation and define
x = log(y) (6.20)
W (x, t) = F∗(y, t) (6.21)
w(x, t) = g(x, t). (6.22)
Thus we can rewrite the partial differences in equation 6.19 as
∂F∗
∂y
=
∂W
∂x
e−x (6.23)
∂ 2F∗
∂y2
= (
∂ 2W
∂x2
− ∂W
∂x
)e−2x (6.24)
∂F∗
∂ t
=
∂W
∂ t
. (6.25)
Substitute equation 6.19 with equations 6.23 to 6.25, the transformed Bellman
equation becomes
∂W
∂ t
+
1
2
σ2
∂ 2W
∂x2
+(µ− 1
2
σ2)
∂W
∂x
−ρW = 0. (6.26)
The finite difference method transforms the continuous state variables Yt and
T into discrete variables and replaces the partial derivatives in the PDE with finite
differences.
Let W (x, t) ≡W (i△x, j△t) ≡Wi, j, where 0 ≤ i ≤ k and 0 ≤ j ≤ h. For any
value of x, it is divided into i shares of equal lengths, which is represented by △x
and hence x = i△x. Similarly, for any value of t, it is divided into j shares of equal
lengths, represented by △t and x = j△t. Note that i and j do not have to be equal.
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In addition, The partial differences in equation 6.26 can be approximated by
∂ 2W
∂x2
≈ [Wi+1, j−2Wi, j +Wi−1, j]/(△x)2 (6.27)
∂W
∂x
≈ [Wi+1, j−Wi−1, j]/2△x (6.28)
∂W
∂ t
≈ [Wi, j−Wi, j−1]/△t. (6.29)
Now substitute equation 6.26 with equations 6.27 to 6.29,
(Wi, j−Wi, j−1)
△t +
1
2
σ2
(Wi+1, j−2Wi, j +Wi−1, j)
(△x)2
+(µ− 1
2
σ2)
(Wi+1, j−Wi−1, j)
2△x −ρWi, j = 0. (6.30)
The partial differential equation then can be written as
(1+ρ△t)Wi, j−1 = p+Wi+1, j + p0Wi, j + p−Wi−1, j (6.31)
where
p+ =
[
1
2
(
σ
△x
)2
+
1
2
(
µ− 12σ2
△x
)]
△t (6.32)
p0 = 1−
(
σ
△x
)2
△t (6.33)
p− =
[
1
2
(
σ
△x
)2
− 1
2
(
µ− 12σ2
△x
)]
△t. (6.34)
Notice that p++ p0+ p− = 1, thus they can be considered as the probabilities
that the value of the Wi at time j−1, multiplied by some discount factor 1+ρ△t,
move upward p+, not changed p0 or move downwards p−, in the next period j.
More specifically, it is a three-point random walk representation of the Geometric
Brownian Motion (GBM).
There are several boundary conditions that need to be satisfied. Firstly, no matter
what value x is, at deadline T , the project value F∗(y,T ) is 0 since the opportunity
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has been lost according to the requirement of the government. Hence
W (x,T ) = 0; (terminal boundary condition). (6.35)
Secondly, if the initial value y = 0, the project value is also zero. According
to the properties of GBM, the stochastic process (Yt)t≥0 will remain to be 0 in
expectation since E(Yt) = yeµt . So, if y = 0, E(Yt) = 0. When y approaches 0 from
the right, i.e., y→ 0+, x approaches −∞, thus
W (−∞, t) = 0; (lower boundary condition). (6.36)
As for the upper boundary condition, the value of x is chosen to be high enough
so that there is at least one positive NPV of the project (w(x, t) > 0) to start with
from time T −△t.
Next, we are going to find the boundary that separates the continuation region
and the stopping region in log terms, namely the curve x∗(t) which is called a
“free boundary” (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). We start from the terminal boundary
and look backwards to find the first column that has at least one positive NPV by
investing immediately. In that column, the value of the project equals the NPV of
the project which can be computed by the equation in Proposition 6.1 since the
NPVs one period after this column are all negative. Then we start to look at all the
columns earlier by comparing the NPVs with the value of waiting in every grids of
the trinomial trees. The smallest x that makes the value of waiting larger than NPV
in each column is denoted by x∗(t) which are the optimal investment thresholds
at that time. The continuation region for a given t is composed of all the x that is
less than x∗(t) and all the x that is larger than x∗(t) forms the stopping region. The
collection of x∗(t) in every column forms the optimal investment threshold frontier.
Proposition 6.3 If the function after transformation W (x, t) is maximized at x =
x∗(t), the original function F∗(y, t) is maximized at y = y∗(t).
See proof of Proposition 6.3 in the Appendix.
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6.5 Comparative Statics
The first problem that we discuss is how the investment threshold of the project that
has limited life time changes, as the life of the project t approaches the time limit T
under different intensity λ , which is shown in Figure 6.1. Generally speaking, the
changes of the investment threshold result from the interaction of two effects, the
investment effect and the gamble effect.
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Fig. 6.1 The investment threshold of the time-constrained project varies with the
project’s life time t, when the intensity λ are 0.2, 2 and 30. The parameter values
are: ρ = 0.1, µ = 0.08, C = 2, I = 50, σ = 0.5 and T = 10
The investment effect is that the decreasing life remaining of the project, T − t,
encourages earlier investment. As the remaining life of the project decreases, the
project is less likely to be successful since there is less time for R&D. Hence the
probability of the jump happening within the remaining life time of the project is
low. In this case, a reasonable strategy would be to start the project sooner so that
there will be more time for R&D, which increases the probability that the jump
will happen within the time limit. Thus the investment effect will lead to a lower
investment threshold.
On the contrary, the gamble effect is that the decreasing life remaining of the
project delays investment. When it is close to the deadline, the probability that the
jump will happen in time is low and the risk of starting the project is high. While
the best strategy that the decision makers will make at this point is probably to
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reject the investment proposal, the only possibility that the investment will take
place is that the potential revenues are extremely high once the project is successful.
Since the revenues of the project are positive related with the underlying stochastic
process Yt , the investment will take place only if Yt is extremely high. Because the
probability that the investment takes place when Yt is of an extremely high value is
low, the success of the project will be dependent on the event of small probabilities,
which is similar to gambling. That is why we call it the gamble effect, which delays
investment.
When λ = 0.2, it is shown that the investment threshold goes up as the life of
project gets closer to the time limit T . The intensity λ represents the average number
of jumps that happen within a unit time, a lower λ implies that the happening of
the jump is lower. The investment effect is weaker for a lower λ , since even if the
project starts sooner which means a longer possible R&D process, the chances that
the jump will happen is still low. Thus the extension of the R&D process is less
valuable than if the intensity is higher. In this case, the gamble effect dominates
throughout the lifetime of the project, and the optimal investment threshold of the
project keeps rising as the project approaches the deadline.
When λ = 2, it is shown that the investment threshold first goes down, then goes
up by the end of the contract, and it eventually disappears before the deadline as
the project approaches the deadline T . When intensity is higher, the chance that
the jump happens is also higher. Thus the investment effect is stronger since earlier
investment and a longer R&D process is more beneficial if the jump is more likely
to happen. In this case, the risk of the project is lower, and the decision maker does
not necessarily need to wait and start the project only if Yt is extremely high. It is
before y∗ reaches its minimum that the investment effect dominates.
However, the two effects are reversed before the deadline. Because even if the
intensity is higher, when it is close to the deadline, the time for the R&D process is
too short for the jump to happen. This is when the gamble effect gets stronger and
finally dominates the investment effect before the deadline of the project. Finally, as
t further approaches T , the optimal investment threshold no longer exists. From this
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point onwards, it is never optimal to accept the investment proposal since the NPVs
of the project are all negative.
When λ further increases to λ = 30, the investment effect is so strong that
the investment threshold of the project keeps decreasing even when the project
is extremely close to the deadline. The gamble effect never dominates in this
circumstance. It is worth noting that both effects are getting stronger as the life
remaining of the project is decreasing. In addition, λ only has influence on the
investment effect while the gamble effect is not affected when λ varies.
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Fig. 6.2 The investment threshold of the time-constrained project varies with the
project’s life time t when the deadline of the project varies from 5 to 500 years. The
parameter values are: ρ = 0.1, µ = 0.08, σ = 0.3, C = 2 and I = 50.
Next, in Figure 6.2, we discuss how the investment threshold of the project
that has time-constraint varies as the contract length increases. Summarily, as T
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increases, the time-constraint will have less effect on the investment decision. More
specifically, when T is great enough or goes to infinity, the time-constrained project
becomes more similar to the unconstrained project and the investment threshold
approaches a constant . The reason is, when T is large enough, the probability that
the jump happens within the time limit, i.e., P(τ¯ < T − t), is 1, which makes the
NPV function of the time-constrained project (see equation 6.16) becomes that of
the unconstrained project (see equation 6.5).
Moreover, the shape of the free boundary is not general. In other models
where time constraints are considered, as the project approaches the deadline, the
investment threshold keeps decreasing if there exists only the investment effect
with which the success probability of the project can only be enhanced by earlier
investment. In this model, as it is closed to the deadline, it is the balance of both
the investment and gamble effect determines the shape of the threshold. Since it is
possible that the gamble effect is stronger, the investment threshold may increase as
“t” approaches “T”.
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Fig. 6.3 The investment threshold of the time-constrained project varies with the
project’s life time t when uncertainty σ are 0.3, 0.5 and 0.8 respectively. The
parameter values are: ρ = 0.1, µ = 0.08, C = 2, I = 50 and T = 10.
Next, in Figures 6.3, this thesis discusses the effect of uncertainty σ has on the
investment threshold of the project at different time t when intensity takes the value
of λ = 0.2 and λ = 2, respectively.
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Figure 6.3 (A) shows that the investment threshold of the time-constrained
project increases as σ goes up for any given time t. This is standard in the real
options literature (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) since the option value increases
with uncertainty while the NPV of the project is not affected, which leads to the
increase of the investment threshold. As t changes, the effect that uncertainty σ has
on the option values forms the gamble effect. In other words, the increase in the
level of uncertainty will boost the magnitude of the gamble effect. However, as it
is shown in the figure, the gap between the threshold with different σ shrinks as
t approaches T . The reason is that the gamble effect does not only dependent on
the level of uncertainty σ , but also dependent on the time left of the project T − t.
As the project approaches its deadline or when T − t is smaller, as σ goes up, the
gamble effect increases slower because waiting becomes more risky in the sense
that there is less time left for the jump to happen. Thus, although the investment
threshold increases as σ goes up for every time t, as it is close to the deadline, the
increase of σ will have less effect on the gamble effect, which leads to the smaller
gap between the investment threshold for different σ .
In Figure 6.3 (B), when the project is away from the deadline T , it is shown
that the investment threshold does not change as σ goes up. This is because the
investment effect dominates when λ is high. Thus even if an increase in σ boost
up the gamble effect, the investment threshold does not go up. As t goes up, the
investment threshold of the project that has lower uncertainty goes down first while
the one with higher uncertainty stays the same. Since the gamble effect is stronger
with higher uncertainty which offsets the investment effect, the investment thresholds
when σ = 0.5 and σ = 0.8 decrease more slowly. However, since the intensity λ is
not high enough, at a certain time t near the deadline, the two effects are reversed.
It is worth noting that the level of uncertainty σ has nothing to do with the
investment effect but it is positive related with the gamble effect.
The investment problem of the project that has time constraint is quite similar to
the exercise problem of the standard American call option. However, there are some
differences between the two.
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On one hand, as it is close to the deadline, the line of NPV=0 for the project
goes up while it goes down for the American call option. For the project that has
time constraint, when the time of the project approaches the maximum length of the
contract “T”, the probability that the project to be successful becomes lower and the
total costs paid will be much higher. In this case, a positive NPV of project requires
that revenues of the project must be higher, which leads to the increasing line when
NPV=0. For the American call option, the NPV of the option at each point in time
is dependent on three factors, which are the price of the underlying asset (Pt), the
strike price (K) and the price of the call option (Ct) itself. The NPV of the option,
NPV (Pt) = max(Pt −K−Ct ,0). As the time approaches the deadline, the price of
option decreases, thus the line that NPV=0 also decreases.
On the other hand, for the American call option, it is never optimal to exercise
before the expiration date if there are no dividends. However, for the project that has
time constraint, the decision maker should exercise the option or invest immediately
when the NPV of the project is larger than the option value of the project.
Lastly, we discuss the difference of the project with a perpetual option with the
time-constrained project by looking at how investment thresholds of both projects
vary under different intensity λ and level of uncertainty σ .
It is shown in Figure 6.4 that the investment threshold of the project with a
perpetual option does not vary with time t. In other words, the investment threshold
is not a time-dependent function. Since for the project with a perpetual option, the
life time remaining is infinity. Thus the decision maker can wait as long as he likes
and the project will only end if the opportunity is given up or the decision maker
decides to wait forever. If there is no time limit on waiting, the option value can be
fully captured since the project will only start when Yt is high enough. However, in
the time-constrained project, the life remaining of the project has to be considered
since the project fails automatically if the investment is not taken place within the
time limit. The option value of this type of project can not be fully captured. In a
word, the two projects’ different capabilities of capturing the option values lead to
the great difference of the two investment thresholds.
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Fig. 6.4 Comparison of the investment thresholds of the perpetual option project Y ∗,
with the time-constrained project y∗ when λ takes the value of λ = 0.2 and λ = 2,
the level of uncertainty σ = 0.3, σ = 0.5 and σ = 0.8. The other parameter values
are: ρ = 0.1, µ = 0.08, C = 2, I = 50 and T = 10.
When λ is small, the investment threshold of the project with a perpetual option
is larger than the one of the time-constrained project with long time remaining
T − t. As the life-remaining of the project decreases, the investment threshold of the
time-constrained project y∗, goes up and it exceeds the investment threshold of the
project with a perpetual option Y ∗ at certain time t. As σ goes up, the option value
increases and the time that y∗ ≥ Y ∗ happens later. This is due to the two projects’
different capabilities of capturing the option values. Thus at any time t, as σ goes
up, Y ∗ always goes up faster than y∗.
When λ is higher, it takes an even longer time for y∗ exceeding Y ∗ since the
investment effect dominates, which reduces y∗ as the project approaches the deadline.
In addition, as σ further increases, Y ∗ strictly dominates y∗. On one hand, the project
without time constraint can fully capture the option value. On the other hand, the
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investment effect is strong with a higher λ . Thus y∗ ≤ Y ∗ maintains for a longer
period of time in this case.
Thus it can be concluded that the time-constrained project provides with more
investment incentives when intensity λ is higher and when uncertainty σ is lower.
6.6 Policy implications
Several policy implications can be drawn from the model.
First, adding a time constraint in the advance purchase commitment contract will
increase the incentive of earlier investments for two reasons. First, the investment
flexibility of the pharmaceutical companies are restricted since the time constraint
itself is as long the companies could wait. However, for the project without time
constraint, the decision maker could wait until the option value is fully realized
before investment. One can even choose to wait forever if the condition is not
favorable enough. Second, a time constraint increases the risk of failure when the
project is close to the deadline and forces the investors to start the project earlier,
especially when the probability of success is low which is represented by “λ” in the
model.
Second, if the authority has already determined to add a time constraint in the
advance purchase commitment contract, dependent on the success probability of the
project, the length of the time constraint should be chosen such that the investment
effect is larger than the gamble effect for most of the time during the contract length.
For the project with lower success probability, the contract length is better set to be
moderately higher so that the companies have enough time to make sure the project
will be successful after investment. Or the company will have to wait until the
revenues are high enough (the gamble effect) so that it is possible for them to start
the project. For the project with higher success probability, a short contract length
will help increase the incentive of earlier investment. The reason is that the decision
makers of these projects can well adapt to the pressure of a short time constraint by
starting the project earlier instead of resorting to the gamble effect. Thus when it
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is close to the deadline, they will not further delay investment but to invest sooner.
Moreover, the longer the contract length, the less effect that time constraint will
have exerted on the decision makers.
6.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we develop a model to value a pharmaceutical R&D project based
on the real options approach. The sudden success of the project is modeled by a
Poisson process where time-to-expiration is also taken into account. It is found that
when the project is of limited time horizon, the intensity of the Poisson process does
not simply add to the discount rate as in many other models, that either has infinite
time horizon or consider catastrophic events. The intensity can be the decisive factor
in determining the optimal investment threshold in that the success probability of
the project is affected. Thus the impression that the intensity only increases the
discount factor can be misleading in particular problems.
We also analyze how the optimal investment threshold of the time-constrained
project changes with respect to the life remaining of the project T − t, the intensity
of the Poisson process λ and the uncertainty of revenues σ . The model shows
that the optimal investment threshold is determined by the balance of two effects:
the investment effect and the gamble effect. The investment effect will reduce the
optimal investment threshold while the gamble effect will increase it. Both effects
get stronger as T − t decreases. When it is close to the deadline, on one hand, the
investment effect is stronger since earlier investment will leave more time for the
R&D process, thus the project has higher success probability. On the other hand, the
gamble effect is also stronger since the success probability is extremely low at this
point. The only possibility that the investment will ever take place is the revenues
are high enough if the project happens to be successful, which leads to waiting and
late investment.
The intensity λ represents the average number of jumps that happen within a
unit time, and a lower λ implies that the happening of the jump is lower. When λ is
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extremely low, earlier investment is not a good strategy since the probability of the
jump happening within the deadline is still low, while the opportunity of investing at
high revenues is given up soon. Thus the investment effect is weaker when λ is of
low values. The uncertainty of revenues σ is positive related to the gamble effect. A
higher σ will increase the probability of Yt reaching a higher value, which increases
the incentives of the decision maker to wait when the project is close to the deadline.
The numerical results show that the time-constrained project does provide with
more investment incentives when intensity λ is higher and when uncertainty σ is
lower, i.e., when the investment effect is stronger and the gamble effect is weaker.
Thus, adding a term in the advance purchase commitments, which states that the
drug development process must be finished within a limited time, could be a good
way to further increase the investment incentives of the private companies to tackle
the problem of Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) in the developing countries.
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6.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6.1
Consider the decision maker is at time t, the NPV of the project is
F(Yt) =EYt
[∫ τ¯
0
e−ρt(−C)dt+
∫ ∞
τ¯
e−ρtYtdt− I
]
=
C
(
e−ρτ¯ −1)
ρ
+
Yt
ρ−µ e
−(ρ−µ)τ¯ − I. (6.37)
Since τ¯ is a random variable at time t which is exponentially distributed, the
above function can also be treated as a function of τ¯ , i.e., F(τ¯). The NPV of the
project can be computed by taking the expectation of F(τ¯),
E (F(τ¯)) =
[(
C
ρ
∫ ∞
0
e−ρxλe−λxdx
)
−C
ρ
]
+
[
Yt
ρ−µ
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−µ)xλe−λxdx
]
− I
=
[
C
ρ
(
λ
ρ+λ
)
−C
ρ
]
+
[
λYt
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λ −µ)
]
− I
=
λYt
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λ −µ) −
(
C
ρ+λ
+ I
)
:=G(Yt). (6.38)
The proof is complete. 
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Proof of Proposition 6.2
Consider the decision maker is at time t, the NPV of the project is
f (Yt , t) =EYt
[∫ τ¯
0
e−ρt(−C)dt+
∫ ∞
τ¯
e−ρtYtdt− I
]
P(τ¯ < T − t)
+EYt
[∫ T−t
0
e−ρt(−C)dt− I
]
P(τ¯ ≥ T − t)
=
[
C
(
e−ρτ¯ −1)
ρ
+
Yt
ρ−µ e
−(ρ−µ)τ¯ − I
](
1− e−λ (T−t)
)
+
C
(
e−ρ(T−t)−1
)
ρ
− I
e−λ (T−t). (6.39)
Since τ¯ is a random variable at time t which is exponentially distributed, the
above function can also be treated as a function of τ¯ , i.e., F(τ¯, t). The NPV of the
project can be computed by taking the expectation of f (τ¯, t),
E ( f (τ¯), t) =
[(
C
ρ
∫ ∞
0
e−ρxλe−λxdx
)
−C
ρ
+
Yt
ρ−µ
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−µ)xλe−λxdx− I
]
×
(
1− e−λ (T−t)
)
+
C
(
e−ρ(T−t)−1
)
ρ
− I
e−λ (T−t)
=
[
λYt
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λ −µ) −
(
C
ρ+λ
+ I
)](
1− e−λ (T−t)
)
+
C
(
e−ρ(T−t)−1
)
ρ
− I
e−λ (T−t)
:=g(Yt , t). (6.40)
The proof is complete. 
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Proof of Proposition 6.3
Since it is assumed that
F∗(y, t) =W (log(y), t) =W (x, t), (6.41)
x∗(t) maximizes W (x, t) if
∂W (x∗(t), t)
∂x∗(t)
= 0 or
∂W (log(y∗(t)), t)
∂ log(y∗(t))
= 0 (6.42)
and
∂ 2W (x∗(t), t)
∂x∗(t)2
< 0 or
∂ 2W (log(y∗(t)), t)
∂ log(y∗(t))2
< 0. (6.43)
Hence,
∂F∗(y∗(t), t)
∂y∗(t)
=
∂W (log(y∗(t)), t)
∂y∗(t)
(6.44)
=
∂W (log(y∗(t)), t)
∂ log(y∗(t))
× ∂ log(y
∗(t))
∂y∗(t)
=
∂W (log(y∗(t)), t)
∂ log(y∗(t))
× 1
y∗(t)
=0. (6.45)
Thus it is proved that the first partial derivative of F∗(·) with respect to y at the
point y = y∗(t) is zero.
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In addition,
∂ 2F∗(y∗(t), t)
∂y∗(t)2
=
∂ 2W (log(y∗(t)), t)
∂y∗(t)2
(6.46)
=∂
(
∂W (log(y∗(t)), t)
∂y∗(t)
)
/∂y∗(t)
=∂
(
∂W (log(y∗(t)), t)
∂ log(y∗(t))
× 1
y∗(t)
)
/∂y∗(t)
=
(
∂ 2W (log(y∗(t)), t)
∂ log(y∗(t))2
1
y∗(t)2
)
=< 0. (6.47)
Thus it is also proved that the second partial derivative of F∗(·) with respect to y
at the point y = y∗(t) is negative. Hence F∗(·) is maximized when x = x∗(t). 
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Conclusions
I conducted a series of studies on three problems in the pharmaceutical industry.
Each problem is discussed by comparing two models in every chapter. For the two
models, one is unconstrained and serves as the benchmark. The other is limited
by some condition that mimics the problem in real life. By comparisons, we have
three major findings. First, the commercialization flexibility will incentivize earlier
investments when uncertainty is low and it delays investment when uncertainty is
high. Moreover, faster approval policy is more effective when uncertainty is low.
Second, the social planner’s project is more desirable in terms of early investment
thus earlier access to the product, as well as a larger overall value of the project.
While the project run by a Private-Public Partnership is a better option in terms of the
flexibility to adjust the product’s quality, but with the cost of delaying commercial-
ization. Last, the contract with a time constraint on the R&D process will increase
the probability of investment and lead to earlier investment, when investment effect
dominates the gamble effect.
However, the models are simplifications of the real situations, further researches
can be done on implementing more factors in practice.
First, in real life, the R&D process is far from observing the fluctuation of the
underlying stochastic process but more complicated. It is usually composed of three
or four phases of clinical trials before the start of commercialization. At certain point
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in time, future decisions are usually made based on all the information available up
to that time. In other words, the information is not Markovian as we have assumed
in the thesis. Moreover, it is highly likely that the project is considered to be not
promising and thus it can be abandoned to avoid losses in the future. In our models,
we either assume that the project will be successful for sure or the costs will be paid
till the end of the project even if it fails. If the abandonment option is implemented,
the value of the project will further go up and thus the project should provide with
more investment incentives.
Second, we assume that there is only one project in each models and the decision
makers are endowed with only two choices which are to invest or to give up the
opportunity. Hence the investment decision is made with no other opportunity costs
besides discounting. However, in reality, the decision maker may have a portfolio of
projects at hand with limited budget. In this case, the decisions made for the one
project will definitely be affected by other projects in that portfolio since the goal
of the decision maker is no longer maximizing the value of a single project but the
portfolio.
Third, we assume that the project is only made for the particular decision maker
with no other competitors. In a competitive industry, the first-mover advantage or
late-mover advantage will need to be considered. The optimal investment timing
does not only depend on the balance of the option value and NPV of the project, but
also subject to the moves of other decision makers.
Fourth, further research can be done on analyzing the optimal length of the
advance purchase commitments contract in chapter 6, in terms of the different goals
that the government or the sponsor want to achieve. For instance, one goal can be
to speed up investments thus the patients can have earlier access to the product,
while only a medium quality of the product is required. Another goal is to invent
a product of high quality while the timing of commercialization is not the priority.
Or the government would want to balance the timing of commercialization with
the product’s quality. Dependent on the various goals, the contracts are optimal in
different sense. Thus the optimal length of the contract will also be different.
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Last, to capture more real life situations, the different ways that we model
the pharmaceutical R&D projects could be combined, where any of the following
factors such as investment lag, different growth rates before and after investment,
commercialization flexibility, sudden success of the project and time constraint can
be considered simultaneously. The analysis combining more factors can be done
easier since some of the combinations have been throughly discussed in the thesis
already.
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